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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Staff Working Document is the tenth in a series of annual progress reports drafted since 2003 
for the purpose of assessing where the EU and its Member States stand in relation to their common 
commitments on financing for development, including aid effectiveness, aid for trade, fast-start 
climate finance and good governance in tax matters.  
The EU and its Member States are making substantial efforts to achieve international targets on the 
quantity and quality of Official Development Assistance (ODA), as enshrined in the Millennium 
and Paris Declarations. Collectively the EU is not only the world’s largest provider of ODA in 
value, but its ODA/GNI ratio is more than double those of Japan and the USA. The EU has also 
made a greater contribution to the achievement of the aid effectiveness agenda than any other 
bilateral donor. The EU is keeping to its commitments on fast-start climate finance, has achieved 
the goal of providing ODA to LDCs equivalent to 0.15 % of GNI, and has increased EU ODA to 
Sub-Saharan Africa by around EUR 5.5 billion in real terms over the period 2004-2011.  
While the direction of change is positive, the pace of implementation is modest. This report shows 
in fact that the EU and its Member States missed their collective 2010 ODA/GNI target of 0.56%, 
and in 2011 the ODA/GNI ratio declined from 0.44% to 0.42%, while aid volumes fell by about 
EUR 400 million. The EU scaling-up process has been uneven, with asymmetric efforts. Member 
States that do not contribute fairly to the burden-sharing effort endanger the performance of the EU 
as a whole and substantially increase the risk of failure for future ODA targets. 
The projections confirm that Member States do not plan to make the necessary increases 
under the current tight budget conditions. At today’s pace, the 0.7% target will not be achieved 
by 2015 as planned. Based on the projections provided by Member States and/or estimates prepared 
using their 2006-2011 compound annual growth rate, the EU27 ODA is expected to increase to 
0.45% by 2015. Considering the expected GNI growth rate till 2015, reaching the 0.7% ODA/GNI 
target would require the EU and its Member States to dramatically step up efforts and almost double 
their current ODA in nominal terms. At the current pace, there is a delay equivalent to about 25 
years on the path to 0.7%, as ODA is projected to increase at an annual rate of 0.01% of GNI. 
Progress on improving aid effectiveness has also been modest. As noted by the OECD DAC 
Secretariat in its analysis of the 2011 Paris Declaration Survey’s findings, these were ‘sobering’ for 
all donors, including the EU and its Member States. As a whole, the EU met only one of the twelve 
indicators relating to donor performance (i.e. coordinated technical cooperation). However, OECD 
DAC also concluded that ‘considerable progress has been made towards many of the remaining 
targets’. Most of the overall progress among bilateral donors worldwide was made possible by the 
performance of EU Member States, which was generally above the ‘all donors’ average, showing a 
significant commitment to achievement of the goals of the Paris Declaration under difficult global 
conditions.  
The Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration recognise the importance of other financial 
flows besides ODA. If sustainable progress towards the MDGs is to be achieved, the financing 
discussion should concentrate on increasing developing countries’ overall revenue base for 
development. The EU can effectively assist its partners in increasing their domestic resources for 
development in line with the principles of good governance in tax matters (transparency, exchange 
of information and fair tax competition). Enhanced international cooperation in tax matters in 
particular will not only increase domestic revenues in developing countries by reducing tax evasion, 
it will also help to address money laundering, corruption and the financing of terrorism.  
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As noted in recent EU policy statements on budget support, and on increasing the impact of EU 
development policy, fair and transparent tax systems are central to fostering citizenship and state-
building, leading to enhanced domestic accountability and political participation. Member States are 
increasingly focusing on the issue of taxation and development. The EU and most Member States 
undertook new initiatives in 2011 to support tax reforms in developing countries. Many Member 
States delivered training indirectly by funding specialised programmes managed by international 
organisations ( such as the IMF, OECD, etc.). Other support focused on tax policy reforms and 
related legislation.  
The EU has consistently supported developing countries in using trade as a tool for development. 
Since 2007, the EU and its Member States have been driving the global Aid for Trade efforts, 
confirming again in 2010 the EU’s position as collectively the largest provider of AfT in the 
world. Indeed, the EU and its Member States together accounted for around 32% of total AfT flows 
in 2010, reaching more than EUR 10.7 billion (EUR 8.2 billion from Member States and EUR 2.5 
billion from the EU), an increase of 4.2% in comparison with 2009. The EU and its Member States 
have exceeded their 2010 EUR 2 billion target for Trade Related Assistance (TRA) since 2008. 
However, for the first time since 2005 there has been a decrease of TRA, in 2010. Total TRA in 
2010 reached EUR 2.6 billion, compared to EUR 2.8 billion in 2009 (or -8% in 2010, as compared 
to +24% in 2009). 
The Commission and the EU Member States are steadfastly committed to providing debt 
relief and are increasingly prioritising the prevention of unsustainable debt. In 2011, the EU 
provided debt relief through participation in the World Bank's Debt Relief Trust Fund (DRTF) to 
fund the participation of the African Development Bank in the HIPC Initiative. By the end of 2011, 
32 countries had reached HIPC completion point, with another seven sub-Saharan countries 
potentially eligible.  
The 2011 Commission Staff Working Paper on ‘Migration and development’ provides further 
analysis of the achievements since 2005 in the area of remittances, and identifies some remaining 
challenges, including capacity building to support partner countries interested in designing 
regulatory frameworks and in promoting financial literacy, new technologies and access to credits 
to stimulate productive investment and job creation. According to the latest estimations of the 
World Bank, global remittance flows to developing countries increased by 12.1% in 2011, and are 
expected to grow at a rate of 7-8 % annually to reach EUR 333.5 billion by 2014. At EU level, total 
EU27 remittance outflows amounted to EUR 31.2 billion in 2010, a 3% increase from the previous 
year (EUR 30.4 billion in 2009), most of which are sent to developing countries.  
At EU level, remittance services have been made cheaper, more transparent, more competitive 
and more reliable. In particular, the transposition of the 2007 Payment Services Directive (PSD) 
into the national legislation of a majority of EU Member States has contributed to increased 
transparency in the provision of payment services, including the remittance market. Moreover, 
several EU Member States (including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) have set up their own remittance price comparison websites on costs and quality of 
services.  
In the current context of financial crisis and budgetary austerity, discussions on innovative 
financing mechanisms have gained a new resonance, both within the EU and at global level. A 
good illustration of this growing interest in innovative financing mechanisms is the G20’s formal 
agreement for the first time to support innovative financing for development and climate change 
and to move forward by using a menu of options. Twelve Member States are currently using or are 
planning to use one or more of the existing innovative financing mechanisms to raise funds for 
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development and/or climate action. Examples of these mechanisms are the International Finance 
Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm), the Advance Market Commitments (AMC), the air ticket levy, 
and the EU Emissions Trading System. Following on from a Commission proposal, the EU is 
currently discussing the possible establishment of a Financial Transaction Tax as a new own 
resource for the EU budget. While the revenues raised would not be earmarked for development per 
se, they could nonetheless facilitate Member States’ efforts to mobilise funding required for 
meeting aid targets and tackling other global challenges. 
Recent EU policy statements have given added emphasis to inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth as a crucial element contributing to long-term poverty reduction and also leading to wealth 
and job creation. The EU and its Member States support programmes to achieve these goals by 
improving competitiveness of local private sectors, enhancing the investment climate, promoting 
MSMEs, facilitating access to finance and encouraging public-private partnerships. Blending 
mechanisms can leverage additional financial resources for development at a time when the 
prospects for increased foreign investment look uncertain. The Busan meeting put forward a 
framework to enable the participation of the private sector in the design and implementation of 
development policies. Furthermore, Corporate Social Responsibility has been given added 
prominence in order to improve the quality of growth.  
The need for improved global governance has been recognised following the Busan Forum during 
which the EU played a prominent role. This involves broadening cooperation to all development 
partners. The EU is committed to self-restraint with regard to avoiding further proliferation of 
global and thematic programmes or vertical funds, and will seek to use and strengthen the existing 
channels. Completing the reforms of multilateral institutions thus takes on added prominence. These 
reforms entail increasing developing countries’ representation and voice.  
The way forward 
In the context of various ongoing international processes, discussions on ODA, climate finance, 
sustainable development, biodiversity and global public goods are closely linked. There seems to 
be an emerging international consensus that a joined-up approach is thus needed to tackle 
global challenges. The proposals for defining new aggregates that would enhance accountability fall 
into three broad categories: (a) changing how we measure development efforts; (b) changing what 
we measure (including by complementing/replacing ODA with a broader aggregate); or (c) 
changing where we measure ODA/GNI ratios (at the recipient level rather than at the donor’s level). 
These discussions will have an impact on future EU Accountability Reports.  
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Introduction  
This Staff Working Document is the tenth in a series of annual progress reports drafted since 2003 
(previously labelled ‘Monterrey report’). Building on previous reports, it assesses where the EU and 
its Member States stand in relation to their common commitments on financing for development. 
This report is especially focused on the evolution in key areas since the previous one, and thus only 
summarises issues discussed at length last year. 
The Report fulfils the Council’s invitation to the European Commission to monitor progress and 
report annually on common EU commitments, initially focusing on ODA commitments made at the 
2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey. The Council later 
expanded the original monitoring mandate to cover all areas of financing for development, 
including aid effectiveness, aid for trade, tax governance and development, and fast-start climate 
finance.  
The report is also intended to serve as input for EU preparations for several international meetings 
to be held in 2012, for the operationalisation of the Busan High Level Forum IV on aid 
effectiveness held in late November 2011, and the bi-annual WTO/ OECD monitoring meeting of 
all donors on aid for trade. It will also contribute to discussions on the post-2015 MDG framework, 
including the UN MDG Review Summit.  
The report is based on input provided by EU Member States and the Commission through (i) the 
2012 EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development, which covers key EU commitments 
related to the international financing for development agenda, (ii) the bi-annual 2011 trade and 
development WTO/OECD survey, (iii) the complementary in-country monitoring, through EU 
Delegations, of aid for trade provided by EU donors and (iv) public sources and OECD online 
databases on development cooperation (IDS Online).  
The Council also called on the Commission to make the annual progress report a model of 
transparency and accountability, and for the second time the Commission is presenting a single, 
comprehensive report covering all topical issues of the international financing for development 
agenda. Furthermore, like last year, all Member States have agreed to the online publication of their 
replies to the annual questionnaire on financing for development. The Commission complements 
this exercise through Donor Profiles that give an overview of the overall development strategy of 
each Member State. These are available on the EuropeAid webpage. Annex 1 lists the bibliography 
for all chapters. Annex 2 presents the methodology applied for analysing ODA and climate finance. 
Annex 3 is the Statistical Annex on ODA trends (including individual graphs for all EU Member 
States showing the gaps from 2010 to reaching 2015 targets for ODA to Africa and ODA to LDCs). 
Annex 4 consists of the Aid for Trade Report 2012. 
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1. REDUCIG AID DEPEDECY AD ICREASIG SUSTAIABLE FIACIG FOR 
DEVELOPMET 
1.1. Improving domestic resource mobilisation  
EU Commitments 
● EU policy on tax and development is set out in the 2010 Communication on “Tax and 
Development - Cooperating with Developing Countries on Promoting Good Governance in Tax 
Matters”
1
 and accompanying Staff Working Document. Their main recommendations were 
endorsed by the Council in its Conclusions of 14 June 2010
2
 and by the European Parliament 
resolution of March 2011. 
● The relevance of this agenda was reinforced through the 2011 Commission Communication on 
“The future approach to EU Budget support to third countries”.
3
 The “Agenda for Change” 
Communication provides further emphasis on tax policy and administration by stating that “the EU 
will continue to promote fair and transparent domestic tax systems in its country programmes, in 
line with the EU principles of good governance in the tax area, alongside international initiatives 
and country by country reporting to enhance financial transparency”.
4
 The main recommendations 
of the Agenda for Change were endorsed by the Council in its Conclusions of 14 May 2012.
5
 
The objective of this chapter is to present EU progress in implementing the Monterrey consensus, 
and subsequent Doha declaration in the area of tax and development. The recent Busan Partnership 
for Effective Development Cooperation highlights the relevance of this area by emphasising its role 
in underpinning sustainable development and combating illicit flows by addressing tax evasion.
6
 
As evidenced by the fiscal difficulties experienced worldwide during 2011, domestic resource 
mobilisation is more crucial than ever for creating a sustainable fiscal space to implement and 
support development programmes. 
 
1.1.1. Strategic Orientations 
Taxes are essential for sustainable development, the legitimacy of the State, economic stability, and 
the financing of public services and infrastructure. The Commission's Communication on Tax and 
Development argued that development aid policies should contribute to building effective, 
efficient, fair, and sustainable tax systems in line with the principles of good governance in tax 
matters (transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition) and to helping generate 
sustainable revenues in partner countries. The Council Conclusions on Tax and Development of 14 
June 2010 stated that the EU would support developing countries in tax policy, tax administration 
                                                 
1
 COM(2010) 163 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COMM_COM_2010_0163_TAX_DEVELOPMENT_EN.PDF  
2
 Council Conclusions on Tax and Development – Cooperating with developing countries in promoting good 
governance in tax matters, 11082/10, 15 June 2010, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st11/st11082.en10.pdf  
3
 COM(2011) 638 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0638:FIN:EN:PDF  
4
 COM(2011) 637 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF  
5
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130243.pdf 
6
 See European Parliament resolution on combating tax fraud and tax evasion. While mainly concerned with Member 
States, the resolution also mentions third parties. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-0137+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN  
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and tax reforms, including the fight against tax evasion and other harmful practices.
7
 A recent IMF 
paper
8
 reviews issues and good practices concerning revenue mobilisation in developing countries 
and provides a useful complementary road-map on implementing reforms in this area. Some of its 
proposals are taken on board below. 
Following the Monterrey Conference of 2003, there has been no visibly increased emphasis on tax 
reform in developing countries, which is in contrast to the significant scale-up of reforms in the 
mirror area of public expenditure management. The 2011 Agenda for Change Communication
9
 calls 
on the EU and its Member States to accelerate progress in this area through promoting more 
domestic resource mobilisation in line with the principles of good governance in tax matters, inter 
alia in the context of budget support operations. Furthermore, as noted in the 2011 Communication 
on Budget support
10
, fair and transparent tax systems are central to fostering citizenship and state-
building, lead to enhanced domestic accountability and political participation. Both 
Communications also reaffirm the principle whereby EU budget support should complement the 
partner country's own efforts to mobilise domestic revenues. The EU will thus continue to promote 
domestic resource mobilisation in its country programmes and will pay special attention to reforms 
in this area when considering eligibility to Budget Support. 
Complementing the above-mentioned EU policies, Member States are increasingly focusing on the 
issue of taxation and development. Recently issued policy statements or analysis include: 
• A DFID briefing note issued in 2009, but still reflecting current UK policy, highlights how 
effective tax systems are central to core priorities including promoting economic growth, 
tackling climate change and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It points that the tax 
system is at the heart of an effective State. Taxes, raised in ways that encourage economic 
growth and promote political accountability, build the political legitimacy of the State and offer 
the eventual “exit strategy from aid”. Furthermore, in February 2012, a select committee
11
 of the 
UK Parliament reporting on tax and development made the case that in view of substantial 
funding available to tax agencies, UK aid should focus more on neglected areas such as 
international and subnational taxation, encouraging broader citizen engagement, and building 
specialised expertise in tax administrations.
12
  
• In 2011, the French Ministry of Finance issued a working paper entitled “Orientations for 
French Cooperation in Tax Matters.”
13
 Noting that taxes are the largest source of development 
finance, the report argues for more attention to be paid to revenue mobilisation through taxes. It 
concludes that in order to enhance the impact of actions this context justifies strengthening 
bilateral cooperation in the field of tax mobilisation while ensuring it is well articulated with 
both France’s bilateral budget support and with all the multilateral programmes. 
• The German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, in collaboration with the 
OECD, has funded a report on appropriate modalities for supporting tax systems.
14
 The 
objective of this 2011 study was to assess the role of various aid approaches and to identify 
practical recommendations for improving development assistance in this area.  
                                                 
7
 More details were provided in the 2011 Accountability Report. 
8
 “Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries”, IMF, March 2011. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/030811.pdf  
9
 COM(2011) 637 final, Op. Cit.  
10
 COM(2011) 638 final, Op.Cit.  
11
 Appointed by the House of Commons. 
12
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/writev/1821/tax04.htm  
13
 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_cooperation_en_matiere_fiscale.pdf  
14
 Draft of September 2011: http://www.taxcompact.net/documents/2011-11-02_Appropriate-Aid-Modalities-for-
Supporting-Tax-Systems_DRAFT.pdf  
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1.1.2. EU assistance to developing countries in tax and customs reform and related capacity 
building  
Supporting domestic resource mobilisation in developing countries remains the most important 
element of tax reform from a macroeconomic standpoint. For low income countries, it is important 
not only to increase domestic revenues, but possibly to consider the tax system as a whole: its 
composition, its impact on economic activity and private investment, its redistributive effects and 
its impact on state-building.  
There is limited systematic and comparable information on tax systems of developing countries. 
There appears to be support for establishing a standard diagnostic framework for assessing tax 
programmes, styled after the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework 
that has been widely used for budget assessments. Nevertheless, recent studies provide insights for 
specific regions: 
• A news release by OECD in January 2012 underlines the role of rising tax revenues in Latin 
America’s economic development. It shows that the average tax to GDP ratio in 12 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries rose almost continuously from 14.9% in 1990 to 19.2% in 
2009. This increase reflects strong economic growth, taxation of non-renewable natural 
resources, and better management of tax administrations. As these countries find themselves in 
relatively strong economic conditions, they are able to consider reforms that generate long-term, 
stable resources for governments to finance development. 
• A 2012 report by the Asian Development Bank15 considers the issue of how mobilised revenue 
can help alleviate inequality. It notes that both government spending and taxation can affect 
inequality and that more tax revenues can be mobilised by broadening tax bases and improving 
tax administration.  
The need for additional revenue is substantial in many developing countries, but the quality of 
measures also matters. More fundamentally still, the centrality of taxation in the exercise of State 
power means that more efficient, fairer, and less corrupt tax systems can spearhead improvement in 
wider governance relations. Developing countries bear primary responsibility for building and 
improving efficient and fair tax systems and committing the necessary resources thereto, with EU 
and Member States supporting these efforts. 
It is unclear whether Member States pursue coordinated and complementary approaches to avoid 
aid fragmentation and unmet demand in some countries – especially those with limited donor 
presence. Nevertheless, a division of labour based on comparative advantage seems to be applied in 
practice to improve coverage of recipient countries.  
In contrast to the previous period, the EU and its Member States do not report initiating any 
new support to national supreme audit institutions, nor were civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and parliaments specifically targeted. The relatively low level of engagement with CSOs 
and national parliaments may lead to low level of stakeholder ownership of tax reform. Indeed, 
where CSOs are weak, key stakeholders in reforms may lack a voice. Similarly, parliaments lacking 
an adequate understanding of public financial management issues may not fully appreciate the 
importance of the laws presented to them in this area, and may not sufficiently scrutinise public 
financial management and hold governments to account.  
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 Mobilising domestic financial resources for development 
The EU and most Member States undertook new initiatives in 2011 to support tax reforms in 
developing countries. Exceptions include both new Member States and some Eurozone members. 
The breadth and scope of activities were quite diverse with respect to focal countries and type of 
assistance. Capacity building activities commonly reported included the development of financial 
management systems, research programmes, training and study tours. Many Member States deliver 
training indirectly by funding specialised programmes managed by international organisations (such 
as the IMF, OECD etc.). Other activities focused on tax policy reforms and related legislation. Most 
of the assistance was concentrated on ACP countries, ENP countries and candidate countries for EU 
membership, as well as Latin America, in contrast with what was reported last year. Ministries of 
finance as well as tax and customs administration constituted the bulk of beneficiaries in recipient 
countries. While three-quarter of Member States provide no or limited support for domestic 
resource mobilisation in the context of Public Financial Management reforms, they nonetheless 
recognise its importance and monitor progress. Only Portugal reports a substantial level of support.  
The EU and about one-third of Member States monitor domestic resource mobilisation. 
Typically, this is done in the context of budget support operations, notably through a Financial 
Management criteria. Some Member States such as Austria and Finland rely on specific indicators 
to monitor domestic resource mobilisation. Similarly, Sweden and Germany refer to indicators 
embedded in joint assessment frameworks. The latter also conducts annual fiduciary risk 
assessments in each country receiving budget support; revenue/GDP below 10% is considered as 
grounds for exclusion from such support. Finally, DFID’s monitoring is indirect, through project 
monitoring of interventions which aim to improve revenue collection in countries.  
 Limiting the impact of tax expenditures 
The general EU position is to discourage tax avoidance. However, a number of developing 
countries, investors and development partners have put forward arguments either in favour of or 
against specific regimes. The basic case made in favour of tax expenditures (including exemptions, 
deductions and credits) is that they promote economic development, for instance by reducing 
investment costs, help overcome market distortions elsewhere and avoid regressive taxation, such as 
taxation of humanitarian aid. The case against specific regimes argues that they lead to revenue 
loss, may reduce transparency and create an uneven playing field, while many of the benefits may 
be gained through appropriate provisions in the general tax code.  
Tax expenditures are substantial in most developing countries and half of EU Member States 
support initiatives aimed at improving tax collection and reducing exemptions. The EU 
supports partner countries in this area through various initiatives. The Commission Communication 
on Tax and Development gives a strong signal towards reducing tax exemptions and provides the 
basis for technical cooperation with partner countries in the tax area, as well as for the bilateral 
support provided through the EU Delegations. Most of the aid provided by Member States is 
through technical assistance. This includes direct support such that provided by Belgium to 
Burundi, Germany to African and Latin American countries, France’s fiscal diagnostic, 
dissemination of best practice by Latvia, and the UK's support to Kosovo
16
. Romania’s support is 
provided through the sponsoring of study tours for experts from Iraq and Palestine. Another 
approach is to fund regional centres, especially those associated with the OECD and the IMF. 
Member States providing such support include Germany, Spain, Hungary and the UK. Finland’s 
involvement in this area was through participation in joint public expenditure reviews in Tanzania.  
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There is no consensus between Member States on whether or not tax exemptions should 
continue to be sought on projects financed through external aid. The debate concerns whether 
tax exemptions reflect a specific case or should be dealt with by encouraging coherence with the 
general EU stance against it, and if taxes are to be financed who should do so (donor, beneficiary, 
and/or government). One rationale for continued exemptions as opposed to funding of taxes by 
donors is to ensure that maximum amount of funding is used to support the specific project, as 
opposed to providing the government’s consolidated budget with resources. Austria for example 
notes the risk of providing such additional resource to governments with weak governance 
structure. The UN has also argued that taxation hinders humanitarian assistance and proposes that 
this type of aid be exempted. In addition to being in-line with the general position on tax exemption, 
one argument in favour of funding taxes by development partners is pragmatic, in line with growing 
programmatic lending and to avoid project implementation difficulties due to insufficient 
counterpart funding and/or delays in granting of tax exemption.  
Some donors and international financial institutions, including the World Bank
17
 in 2004, 
have already changed their rules and regulations towards funding all reasonable project costs 
including taxes. The practice regarding tax exemptions of EU projects is also moving in this 
direction. However, a common approach has not yet been adopted by Member States. Some are 
considering eliminating the requirement that their projects be tax exempt without necessarily 
adopting a formal position on the matter (e.g. Finland, Denmark and UK), while others have either 
expressed cautious support (e.g. Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany) or are in favour of no 
longer requiring tax exemptions (Estonia, Slovenia, France and Romania are already implementing 
this measure) and/or start funding taxes. Despite progress, the following considerations still remain: 
(a) certain types of exemptions may need to remain (humanitarian aid, officially supported credits, 
and exemptions based on double taxation treaties); (b) donor approaches (EU, OECD and UN) 
would need to be harmonised; and (c) as pointed out by Hungary, specifics would need to be 
worked-out. 
 
1.1.3. Promoting good governance in the tax area 
The EU and most Member States have provided support in the past for addressing tax evasion and 
harmful tax competition, and promote the principles of good governance in tax matters in their 
cooperation policy.  
The EU promotes the principles of good governance in tax matters with partner countries by: 
• Including specific references to the principles of good governance and to the need for 
strengthening tax systems in economic cooperation, partnership and other agreements 
with third countries. 
– Making the best use of its relevant dialogue and assessment tools for the monitoring of 
domestic revenue efforts and good governance commitments. Mainstreaming DRM 
issues into EU budget support programmes. 
– Providing capacity building in tax matters to developing countries committed to the 
principles of good governance in the tax area.  
The Commission and nine Member States reported new activities in 2011. Member States 
completing new Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA) were Belgium, Czech Republic and 
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Slovak Republic. Technical assistance and training seminars were also funded by Germany 
(supporting the East Africa Community and Central American countries) Spain, France (Chad), 
Slovak Republic (Georgia and Serbia) and UK (Kenya and Ghana). The German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) also continued its support of the International 
Tax Compact
18
 (ITC) – an informal international action and dialogue platform grouping bilateral 
and multilateral donors to strengthen international cooperation with developing and transition 
countries to fight tax evasion and avoidance.  
 Adoption and implementation of the OECD Guidelines on Transfer Pricing 
Transfer pricing rules determine how international transactions within a multinational company 
must be priced to ensure each country receives its fair share of tax. The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, approved by the OECD Council in their original version in 1995 (last updated in 2010), 
provide guidance on its application. At the OECD’s first Global Forum on Transfer Pricing on 28 
March 2012, tax officials from 90 countries agreed on the need to simplify transfer pricing rules, 
strengthen the guidelines on intangible issues and improve the efficiency of dispute resolution. In 
the coming year, the Global Forum will carry out a transfer pricing risk assessment, developing a 
detailed “how-to” manual
19
 which will establish good practices for governments when they assess 
transfer pricing risk at the beginning of an audit. 
In the past years, about half of the Member States had already provided assistance with 
implementing OECD guidelines on transfer pricing. Eight Member States, as well as the EU, 
supported new initiatives in this area during 2011. The Commission, Netherlands and Belgium 
participated in the OECD task force subgroup on Transfer Pricing. Belgium, Spain, France, 
Slovenia and UK organised training seminars – some in collaboration with OECD. The EU and 
some Member States, at times in collaboration with OECD, supported developing countries in 
drafting transfer pricing regulations: EU pilot initiative in Ghana and Vietnam; Germany’s support 
to Ghana; Estonia’s support to Moldova; and UK’s assistance to Kenya and Ghana.  
In 2011, the EU funded a study
20
 on transfer pricing oriented towards strengthening this area 
in developing countries. The study recommends suitable approaches for supporting developing 
countries in the adoption and implementation of transfer pricing rules in line with international 
standards in order to increase tax revenue. The study outlines the current transfer pricing situation in 
Ghana, Honduras, Kenya and Vietnam, and makes recommendations for donor support to 
developing countries. As a follow up to the study, the Commission envisages providing support to 
capacity building in transfer pricing to a number of developing countries. 
To increase donor coordination in the field of transfer pricing which results in better targeted and 
more coordinated assistance to the partner countries an OECD/EU/WB initiative on transfer 
pricing was initiated. 
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 Revenue Transparency
21
 
The OECD’s 2011 publication on tax transparency
22
 documents substantial progress in areas 
such as multilateral conventions, and Tax Information Exchange Agreements as well as 
double taxation conventions. The number of agreements that meet the international standard has 
increased by more than 700 since the G20 put a spotlight on the issue. These agreements are starting 
to yield real results as mechanisms for the enforcement of tax laws. During 2011, members of the 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes have issued reports 
(peer reviews) on the 14 EU Member States.
23
 These reviews provide information on agreements 
with developing countries. 
EU Member States also participate in other initiatives that contribute to transparency and combating 
corruption. In particular, 23 EU Member States report their support and/or adherence to the United 
Nations Convention against corruption
24
 and 20 Member States participated in the implementation 
of the OECD convention on combatting bribery of foreign officials.
25
 A further 9 Member States 
participated in the Stolen Asset Recovery initiative
26
 launched in 2007 by the World Bank and UN.  
In addition, in October 2011 the Commission adopted a legislative proposal
27
 for a new set of 
disclosure requirements for extractive companies that are based in EU countries. Under the new 
rules, companies in the EU would have to publish all payments to the governments in countries they 
operate in. This proposal is currently being discussed in the Council and the European Parliament. 
The increase in transparency will contribute to fighting corruption, increase resource-rich countries' 
accountability and improve domestic revenue mobilisation. 
Box 1.1.3 The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Some 3.5 billion people live in countries rich in oil, gas and minerals. Through good governance the exploitation of 
these resources can generate large domestic revenues to foster inclusive growth, discourage conflict and reduce poverty.  
The EITI is a voluntary process aimed at strengthening governance by improving transparency and 
accountability in the extractive industries sector. With 35 implementing countries now, the initiative is becoming a 
global standard for corporate governance and transparency. The EITI requests that companies publish payments to 
governments, and that the latter, in turn, disclose revenues received from companies. This enhances domestic 
accountability and strengthens the demand for good governance so as to reduce corruption related to extractive 
activities. EITI implementation slowed down in 2011. Nevertheless, 13 countries have now achieved EITI-compliant 
status (compared to 11 last year) and 20 countries are new candidates.  
The EU is an increasingly active participant in, and supporter of, this initiative. Its position is reflected in the recent 
European strategy on the sustainable supply of raw materials, and in the follow-up to the commitments on enhanced 
support made in the 2010 Tax and Development Communication. The Commission is a member of the Steering 
Working Group of EITI and a member/observer of the EITI Board. It provided further support to EITI during 2011 
through (a) co-financing of two conferences (i.e., 5th Global Conference and National Coordinators Conference); (b) 
bilateral support via Delegations; and (c) contribution to World Bank EITI Trust Fund.  
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Several Member States listed activities in support of EITI: 
• Belgium and UK provided funding to the multilateral Trust Fund administered by the World Bank. In addition to 
funding the Trust fund, Germany, Denmark and Netherlands also supported the EITI secretariat by funding its 
activities. Denmark also funded the 2011 EITI Global Conference. Netherlands was an EITI board member in 
2011, hosting the 17th board meeting June 2011, and has seconded a staff member to EITI secretariat for the period 
2012 – 2015. 
• Germany is supporting the EITI implementation through various bilateral as well as regional TC-projects, e.g. in 
DR Congo.  
• The Italian Government continues to support EITI by: (a) favouring its outreach proposing a suitable scoring 
system so as to provide an incentive for good performance by implementing Countries; (c) supporting the New 
EITI rules without expanding the scope of the Initiative; (d) improved monitoring. A private Italian enterprise 
engaged in the oil and gas, power generation, petrochemicals, oilfield services and engineering industries is 
implementing pilot projects and initiatives in Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Kazhakstan and Timor Leste.  
 Support to international and regional initiatives, and organisations 
The EU and many Member States indicated that they continued relying on intermediaries when 
supporting developing countries’ tax reform agendas. This is being done through international 
initiatives such as the Africa Tax Administration Forum (ATAF), the OECD, the International Tax 
Compact (ITC) and International Tax Dialogue
28
 (ITD), “Centro Inter-Americano de 
Administraciones” (CIAT) and three IMF facilities (i.e. Regional Technical Centres, the Trust Fund 
on Tax Policy and Administration, and the Topical Trust Fund on Managing Natural resource 
Wealth).  
The IMF remains the prime partner,receiving by far the most financial support. ITC was the next 
largest recipient, albeit at a much smaller scale. While there are a number of institutions receiving 
support, there is insufficient information to assess whether this leads to inefficiency and 
unnecessary segmentation in delivery of tax reforms. 
 Emerging themes 
While the impact of the new approach to EU budget support will only be evident in the future, it is 
likely that EU and Member States will incorporate tax administration and fair tax collection as part 
of their budget support eligibility criteria. 
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1.2. Maintaining sustainable debt levels  
EU Commitments 
● Council Conclusions of 11 3ov 2008
29
, § 44: ‘The EU will take action to help restore and 
preserve debt sustainability in low-income countries (…), to prevent unsustainable lending 
behaviour by lenders which have not contributed to alleviating the burden of poor countries, and to 
deter aggressive litigation by distressed-debt funds. The EU also agrees not to sell claims on HIPCs 
to creditors unwilling to provide debt relief.’ 
● Council Conclusions of 18 May 2009
30
: (§12): ‘the EU will continue supporting the existing debt 
relief initiatives, in particular the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) and values the Evian approach as an appropriate 
flexible tool to ensure debt sustainability’.  
● In line with the Doha Declaration, the EU has also confirmed in the Council Conclusions of 18 
May 2009 (§12), that it ’supports discussions, if relevant, on enhanced forms of sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanisms, based on existing frameworks and principles, including the Paris Club, 
with a broad creditors’ and debtors participation and ensuring comparable burden-sharing among 
creditors with a central role for the Bretton Woods Institutions in the debate. 
In 2011, the European Commission and the EU Member States have maintained their 
engagement in providing debt relief and are increasingly prioritising actions on the 
prevention of unsustainable debt, including by:  
• reducing debt levels through debt relief, using existing mechanisms (HIPC, Paris Club, etc.); 
• strengthening public debt management capacity to avoid unsustainable debt levels;  
• supporting greater transparancy in the new forms of financing; 
• fighting against aggressive litigation by vulture funds.  
In addition, most EU Member States have highlighted three current challenges to continue 
ensuring debt sustainability:  
• In light of the increased weight of bilateral non-Paris Club creditors, there is a need for more 
transparency and closer collaboration between these creditors and the Paris Club in order to 
guarantee that debt relief operations deliver sufficient relief and preserve a fair burden sharing. 
• Debt relief under the HIPC Initiative and MDRI has also created new borrowing space. Domestic 
debt is likely to grow in importance as domestic savings increase and governments seek to 
develop domestic debt markets. Low Income Countries (LICs) are likely to face new risks as 
the range of creditors and debt instruments continues to expand.
31
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• Moreover, due in part to the current economic context, many countries remain vulnerable to 
shocks, particularly exporters, facing risk of unsustainable debt in the future. 
 
1.2.1. Honouring EU commitments on debt relief  
For the past decade, debt relief has been a key tool for achieving debt sustainability. It has 
been implemented through the HIPC/MDRI initiative, complemented with bilateral and other types 
of debt forgiveness.  
The Commission and EU Member States have continued to deliver on their commitments on 
debt relief. In 2011, the EU provided debt relief through participation to the World Bank's Debt 
Relief Trust Fund (DRTF) to support the participation of the African Development Bank in the 
HIPC Initiative. HIPC Interim debt relief in the form of coverage of debt service payments or 
arrears clearance was also provided to the following countries: Comoros, DRC, Ivory Coast, Guinea 
and Togo. Full relief further to reaching HIPC completion point was provided to Liberia in early 
2011. 
As of end-2011, 32 countries had reached HIPC completion point, with another 7 sub-Saharan 
countries potentially eligible.
32
 
Debt relief has markedly improved the debt position of the 32 post-completion point Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries, bringing their debt indicators to sustainable levels. Debt cancelation has 
brought, and still brings, strong positive effects for debt-distressed countries, allowing more fiscal 
space for poverty related expenditures. 
To date, debt reduction packages under the HIPC Initiative have been approved for 36 
countries, 30 of them in Africa, providing EUR 54.6 billion (USD 76 billion) in debt-service relief 
over time. The debt stocks of the 36 post-decision-point HIPCs have been reduced by over 90 
%.
33
 
It is to be mentioned that the IMF and IDA Boards had informal discussion on the future of 
the HIPC Initiative during 2011. So far, this question remains an open issue and the focus is 
rather on ensuring a close monitoring of vulnerabilities of Low Income Countries than only 
focusing on HIPC.
34
 
 
1.2.2. Public Debt Management: a critical component of debt sustainability 
In 2002, the Monterrey Consensus called for a speedy, effective and full implementation of the 
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and for increased international cooperation for 
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sustainable debt financing.
35
 The G8/Africa Joint Declaration of the Deauville G8 summit of May 
2011 reiterated the call to preserve debt sustainability in Africa.
36
  
Debt relief alone is not sufficient to guarantee debt sustainability. As illustrated in the latest 
World Bank report on HIPC Status
37
, strengthening debt management capacity and institutions in 
HIPC countries is also a priority. According to this study, seven post-Completion Point HIPCs 
remain at high risk of debt distress after HIPC and MDRI relief, and 10 at moderate risk.  
While good debt management has proven to be a valuable asset in mitigating the effects of external 
shocks, poor public debt management contributes to the negative impact of these shocks and 
seriously undermines a country’s ability to achieve sustainable growth. Governments, both creditor 
and borrower, need to closely monitor debt management. 
"Debt management systems in most African countries have advanced, albeit only marginally" 
according to the mutual review of development effectiveness in Africa.
38
 To reduce their debt 
vulnerabilities sustainably, countries need to pursue cautious borrowing policies and 
strengthen their public debt management capacity.  
Beyond HIPC and MDRI, EU Member States have maintained a strong support to enhance debt 
management capacities of developing countries. The main international initiatives to support better 
debt management and to which the EU contributes include the Debt Management Facility and the 
Debt Management and Financial Analysis Software.
39
 (see box 1.2.2) The European Commission 
has committed new contribution of EUR 3 million to the World Bank's Debt Management Facility 
(DMF Trust Fund) and EUR 3 million to UNCTAD's Debt Management and Financial Analysis 
Software (DMFAS); both signed in December 2011. 
Box 1.2.2: The Debt Management Value Chain 
● The World Bank Debt Management Facility‘s covers “upstream” activities:  
- Diagnosing the performance of debt management in a country (DEMPA) 
- Assistance in formulating reform plans to correct the weaknesses identified by the DEMPA (Reform Plan) 
- Preparing a reform plan to address the weaknesses identified (Reform Plan) 
- Preparing a medium term debt strategy (MTDS) 
● The Debt Management and Financial Analysis Software from UNCTAD comparative advantage is in the 
‘downstream’ activities needed for implementing the DMF Reform Plan and strategy, through: 
- Supporting countries in implementing debt management reform plans 
- Providing debt management systems (the DMFAS system) 
- Training the debt management staff in debt reporting, operations, statistics and analysis 
- Advising on debt office reorganisation, integration and staffing 
- Providing sustainable support (Helpdesk) for these areas 
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1.2.3. Diversified sources of lending and debt vulnerabilities 
In a number of LICs, finding sources to finance priority infrastructure investments has led to an 
increase of reliance on non-concessional external borrowing, requiring a close monitoring on the 
evolution of debt vulnerabilities in those countries.
40
 In addition, keeping debt at sustainable levels 
will continue to be a necessity in the context of EU blending operations in developing countries. 
Debt sustainability is assessed by the European Commission in all of the activities in the framework 
of innovative financing (see chapter 3.1 on Innovative Financing).  
Over recent years, a number of new public and private creditors have increased their lending 
to Africa’s Low-Income Countries, creating concerns of swelling debt burdens. Intra-developing 
country lending, or so-called South-South flows, have been a driving force behind the rise in 
lending by bilateral creditors and new commitments. Between 2007 and 2010, bilateral creditors 
signed new loan agreements totaling around EUR 102 billion (USD 135 billion), of which China 
accounted for close to one third.  
Figure 1.2.3 
et Debt Flows by Creditor Type, 2001-2010      et Debt Flows by Borrower Type, 2001-2010 
 
 
Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System in World Bank Global Finance 2012: External Debt of Developing 
Countries 
 
In an effort to cast more light on the recent activities of new donors, the OECD, in collaboration 
with the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), conducted a survey of nine 
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developing countries that are considered as important new lenders (Brazil, Chile, China, India, 
Malaysia, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela). So far only Chile, Malaysia, and 
Thailand responded to the survey.
41
 
A recent analysis by the Africa Economic Outlook
42
 shows a relatively limited impact of 
financing from the non-Paris Club creditors, though the lack of transparency does not allow to 
fully measure the situation. The lack of transparency in loan contracting processes from non-
Paris Club continues to constitute a risk, especially for the most fragile nations. Raising 
transparency standards for financial transactions between African countries and their new partners 
would help developing economies to borrow more sustainably. This would strengthen the 
credibility of the "emerging" partners as part of the international financial governance structure.
43
 
The G8 Action Plan for Good Financial Governance in Africa emphasises the importance of the 
joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework as the framework of choice for the “new” 
donors and lenders. 
The growing importance of private creditors within the new lenders also increased the need for 
closer coordination amongst different types of lenders. In 2010, lending by private creditors to 
developing countries significantly increased from EUR 61.9 billion (USD 86 billion) in 2009 to 
EUR 320.1 billion (USD 424 billion) in 2010.
44
 
The EU as a whole believes that creditor coordination is key to reaching the objective of restoring 
and preserving debt sustainability in LICs. In that connection, EU Member States call for enhanced 
dialogue and outreach to non-Paris Club offical bilateral creditors.  
 
1.2.4. The status of Vulture Fund Litigation 
The problem posed by vulture funds is also a major concern. Vulture fund modus operandi is 
simple: commercial creditors purchase distressed debt on the secondary market, significantly below 
its face value, and seek to recover the full amount, including through litigation. 
Litigation is possible because most debt relief initiatives, such as the HIPC initiative, do not alter 
the legal rights and obligations between HIPCs and their external creditors. Accordingly, creditors 
are legally entitled to use available legal mechanisms to enforce their credit claims against HIPCs, 
unless the HIPC debtors and their creditors reach bilateral legal agreements which would put their 
debt into the authority of HIPC initiative.  
 
Figure 1.2.4 Where Vulture Funds Strike
45
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The IMF reports that in some cases, the claims by vulture funds constitute as much as 12-13 % of a 
country’s gross domestic product; 11 HIPCs have been targeted so far in forty-six lawsuits and the 
plaintiffs are concentrated in three countries, ie. USA (8), British Virgin Islands (7), and the United 
Kingdom (4).
46
 The lawsuits are mostly concentrated in a few courts (New York (15), London and 
Jersey (7), Paris (7)).47 
 
Box 1.2.4: Vulture Funds in Figures
48
 
– Vulture funds have average recovery rates of about 3 to 20 times their investment, 
equivalent to returns of (net legal fees) 300-2000 %.  
– The vulture funds exert pressure on the sovereign debtor by attempting to obtain 
attachment of the government’s assets abroad: in a recent case against Zambia, a vulture 
fund, having bought a debt for EUR 2.16 million (USD 3 million), sued Zambia for EUR 39.55 
million (USD 55 million) and was awarded EUR 11.14 million (USD 15.5 million) at High 
Court of England and Wales. 
– Litigation is typically protracted with many lawsuits taking 3 to 10 years to “settle.” Legal 
documents indicate six years as a conservative medium estimate for recovery, which 
suggests that annualised returns average 50 to 333 % 
– Some of these claims were bought at roughly 10 % of face value, implying very high gross 
recovery rates. Subtracting legal costs, often recouped from the sovereign debtor, these 
recovery rates are probably the highest in the distressed debt market. 
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– The World Bank estimates that more than one-third of the countries which have qualified for its 
debt relief have been targeted with lawsuits by at least 38 litigating creditors with judgments 
totalling USD 1 billion in 26 of these cases. Out of this amount 72% of the judgments have been 
against Regional Member Countries.49  
 
In 2010, the Paris Club confirmed its deep concern over vulture fund litigation. Taking stock 
of the harmful consequences of litigation for HIPC countries, and consistent with the principle of 
comparability of treatment, the Paris Club had resolved
50
 in May 2007 to avoid the sale of their 
claims on HIPCs to other creditors who do not intend to provide debt relief under the HIPC 
initiative. The Paris Club had also urged other creditors to follow suit.  
In that connection, five EU Member States have implemented specific interventions in order to 
prevent the actions of distressed-debt funds:  
– On April 6, 2008, Belgium has passed a bill to prevent the seizure or transfer of public 
funds for international cooperation, in particular related to the methods of the Vulture 
Funds. Belgium also aims to assist African countries in their legal protection against 
vulture funds through financial support to the African Legal Support Facility. 
– Spain regularly supports, on a case by case basis, the initiatives and discussions that take 
place in the Paris Club in order to prevent aggressive litigation against HIPCs. Spain is 
committed not to sell or securitize debt owed by HIPC countries. Spain also supports the 
Debt Reduction Facility by the World Bank, that addresses the issue of litigating creditors.  
– France is strongly supporting the Debt Reduction Facility by the World Bank. 
– Italy is commited with any intervention to prevent aggressive litigation against HIPCs 
within the Paris Club and through the World Bank. 
– In 2011, the UK made the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010 permanent. This 
legislation limits the amount of money that commercial creditors can recover from 
developing countries progressing through the HIPC Initiative, removing the incentive to 
pursue them in courts. 
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2. ITERATIOAL PRIVATE FLOWS FOR DEVELOPMET 
2.1. Supporting trade as an engine for development 
EU Commitments 
In 2007, the EU Aid for Trade Strategy51 aimed at increasing financial resources for Aid for Trade 
and improving its impact on poverty reduction. In particular, the EU committed to: 
– Increasing EU Aid for Trade  within the gradual increase of overall EU aid; 
– Enhancing the Pro-poor Focus and Quality of EU AfT; 
– Increasing EU-wide and Member State donors’ capacity in line with globally agreed aid 
effectiveness principles; 
– Building upon, fostering and supporting ACP regional integration processes with an ACP 
specific angle of EU AfT. 
– Collectively spend EUR 2 billion annually on Trade-Related Assistance by 2010 (EUR 1 
billion from MSs and the Commission respectively). In the range of 50% of the increase to 
be available to ACP countries. 
 
2.1.1. Towards a more focused EU policy framework on Trade and Development 
The EU's new trade, growth and development policy outlines how the EU’s trade and investment 
policies should be used to foster inclusive growth and sustainable development in developing 
countries. In particular, the EU has agreed on the need for more differentiation among 
developing countries in order to better reflect their differences in needs, potentials and objectives, 
and to better target Aid for Trade initiatives at LDCs and other countries most in need. At the same 
time, LDCs need to more systematically and effectively include trade in their development 
strategies. 
Many developing countries have deepened their integration into the world economy and have 
become increasingly important players in multilateral and international trade. The rise of emerging 
economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), both as economic and 
political players, is striking in that regard and it serves as  a positive illustration that increased 
participation in world trade can be an engine for economic growth and poverty reduction in 
developing countries. While these changes have helped lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty, 
not all developing countries have enjoyed the same improvements. This is particularly true for 
LDCs, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, which have been further marginalised and whose economy 
remains vulnerable to economic shocks, notably because of their dependence on a few export 
products, particularly primary commodities. This points to the fact that while trade is a necessary 
condition for development, it is not sufficient and domestic reforms are essential to harness the 
benefits of trade for growth and poverty reduction. 
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In times of budgetary constraints and when aid budgets are being closely scrutinised, the need to 
improve accountability and to show results becomes even more stringent. This is especially true 
in the case of Aid for Trade, which has become an increasingly important priority in development 
cooperation. The topic was discussed at highest level in 2011, in the framework of the Third Global 
Review of Aid for Trade
52
. The OECD, with financial support from the European Commission, is 
preparing a study to analyse and assess good practices in developing country-owned results 
measurement frameworks for trade-related aid activities, with a view to providing the development 
and trade community with recommendations on how to measure Aid for Trade results.
53
 The 
European Commission is also providing funding to the International Trade Centre (ITC) for the 
launch of a re-developed Market Access Map, which will provide global trade related information 
in particular to low income countries.  
 
2.1.2. Taking stock of the way the EU has delivered on its Trade and Development commitments 
since 2002 
In its 2002 Communication on “Trade and Development”
54
, the Commission had pledged to grant 
developing countries greater access to the EU market. In the 2007 Joint Aid for Trade Strategy
55
, 
the EU and its Member States committed to provide developing countries with more Aid for Trade. 
The EU has delivered well on both accounts, leading the way at global level and making the EU 
the most open market to developing countries in the world.
56
 This has mainly been achieved 
through the EU's Generalised System of Preferences. In particular, the 'Everything but Arms' 
scheme provides LDCs with duty-free quota-free market access to the EU for all their products 
except arms. As for the GSP+, it is the flagship EU trade policy instrument supporting sustainable 
development and good governance in developing countries. 
In addition, the EU has facilitated the use of existing preferential schemes through new and 
simpler GSP rules of origin
57
, and made it easier for developing countries to get practical 
information on access to the EU market through the establishment of the online Export Helpdesk.
58
  
The EU has also boosted its bilateral trade relations with developing countries. Since 2002, the 
EU and ACP countries have been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements. In addition, a 
series of Free Trade Agreement negotiations have been launched, and in several cases already 
concluded, with more advanced developing countries and regions. 
The EU’s trade policy has also supported the promotion of regional integration of developing 
countries’ markets, although results have often fallen short of expectations. A key difficulty is the 
limited capacity of regional organisations to formulate project proposals that are viable and 
supported by their members. 
In line with the EU PCD commitments, the EU has strived to improve the coherence and 
complementarity between the EU’s trade and development policies. Several key areas of progress 
were identified in the “EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development”
59
, including trade 
negotiations, market access, the decent work agenda, corporate social responsibility, and intellectual 
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property rights. These orientations were fully taken into consideration in the 2012 Communication 
on "Trade, Growth and Development", adopted by the Commission on 27 January 2012
60
. The 
Communication sets new orientations for the next decade on ways to improve the contribution of 
the EU's trade and investment policies to development. This was followed, on 16 March 2012, by 
the adoption of Council Conclusions
61
 on this topic. The latter set out how Aid for Trade from the 
EU and its Member States can be better targeted, notably through: 
– continued global leadership of the EU and its Member States to respond to the Aid for 
Trade demands; 
– better targeted, result-oriented and coordinated Aid for Trade as part of the aid and 
development effectiveness agenda, as agreed in Busan; 
– encouraging developing countries to integrate trade as a strong component in their 
development strategies; 
– enhancing the complementarity and coherence between trade and development 
instruments; 
– greater focus on LDCs and developing countries most in need;  
– better coordination of EU and Member States’ AfT and alignment with strategies of 
partner countries; 
– support aimed at helping developing countries' small-scale operators to capture the benefits 
of trade; 
– work with new and traditional partners to increase the effectiveness of the Enhanced 
Integrated Framework and other internationally recognised frameworks, and focus on 
impact and results. 
 
2.1.3. Progress on Aid for Trade
62
 
Since 2007, the EU and its Member States have been driving the global Aid for Trade efforts, 
confirming again in 2010 the EU’s position as collectively the largest provider of AfT in the 
world. Indeed, the EU and Member States accounted for around 32% of total AfT flows in 2010, 
reaching more than EUR 10.7 billion (EUR 8.2 billion from EU Member States and EUR 2.5 billion 
from the EU), an increase of 4.2% in comparison with last year. 
As highlighted in last year’s report, the EU and its Member States had already met their 2010 EUR 
2 billion target for Trade Related Assistance (TRA) since 2008, however, for the first time since 
2005, there was a decrease of TRA between 2009 and 2010Total TRA in 2010 reached EUR 2.6 
billion, compared to EUR 2.8 billion in 2009 (or -8% in 2010, to be compared to +24% in 2009). 
Figure 2.1.3. Aid for Trade (EU and Member states, in EUR million) 
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A central observation is the growing complementarity between the EU and its Member States, 
in terms of geographical distribution, sector presence, instruments used and size of projects.  
– In terms of geographical distribution: Africa continues to receive the largest share of 
AfT flows (38% of the total), both from the EU and from the Member States, with a total 
of EUR 3.9 billion in 2010. It is followed by Asia (20%), Europe (13%) and America 
(9%). The second primary destination of EU AfT flows is Europe, while it is Asia for 
Member States. The share of AfT to LDCs declined to 16% of total AfT in 2010 (EUR 1.7 
billion against EUR 8.7 billion to non-LDCs), compared to 22% in 2009. This is partially 
due to cyclical and EU programming factors.  
– In terms of sectoral presence: while the EU AfT projects are essentially focused on three 
main sectors, namely agriculture (35%), transport and storage (29%) and energy (13%), 
Member States are more focused on energy (33%), with agriculture and transport 
representing smaller shares of the total (17% and 12%). Moreover, Member States are also 
present in banking and financial services, while the EU is not. 
– In terms of instruments used: while grants still represent 100% of AfT programmes of 
the EU institutions, Member States finance 43% of their AfT programmes through loans, 
and 13% through equity investments. As a result of this, the share of grants has decreased 
in the overall AfT flows of the EU and Member States, while it has substantially increased 
for loans. This could also explain the decrease of the share of AfT flows to LDCs, which 
are the primary beneficiaries of grants. 
– In terms of size of projects: the average size of EU projects is ten times the average size 
of Member States projects (EUR 11.2 million in the case of EU and EUR 1.1 million for 
Member States).  
The analysis of replies from the EU Delegations and Member States Representations in 
developing countries to this year's AfT questionnaires shows a moderate improvement in terms 
of the partner-donor policy dialogue; the availability of updated trade needs assessments; joint 
operations and harmonisation; the inclusion of strategic regional economic integration priorities into 
the national development plan or trade strategy; and in highlighting the prominent hurdles for 
assessing AfT programmes and projects. 
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2.2. Remittances as an instrument of development 
EU Commitments 
• Since 2009, the EU and its Member States are committed “to promote transparent, cheaper, 
faster and more secure flows of remittances to migrants’ countries of origin, and to ensure that 
relevant legislation does not contain provisions hampering the effective use of legal remittance 
channels”
63
. 
 
2.2.1. Towards a renewed EU overarching framework for the cooperation with third countries in 
the area of migration and mobility 
On 29 May 2012, the Council adopted Conclusions
64
 on “The global approach to migration and 
mobility”, following the Commission Communication on this subject issued in November 2011.
65
 
The objective was to strengthen the overarching framework for the cooperation with third countries 
in the area of migration and mobility, which was defined for the first time in 2005. One of the 
operational priorities is precisely to maximise the development impact of migration and mobility, 
including by facilitating remittances and reducing transaction costs. In particular, the Council 
reaffirmed “the need to ensure faster, easier and cheaper remittance transfers and enhance the 
impact on development of social and financial remittances while ensuring coherence with other 
development priorities”. 
The 2011 Commission Staff Working Paper on “Migration and development”
66
 accompanying the 
afore-mentioned Communication provides further analysis of the achievements since 2005 in the 
area of remittances, and identifies some remaining challenges, including on capacity building to 
support partner countries interested in designing regulatory frameworks and into promoting 
financial literacy, new technologies and access to credits to stimulate productive investment and job 
creation. 
In 2011, the European Commission launched a study to assess the state of implementation of 
existing EU commitments with regard to remittances. The study will be published in the second half 
of 2012. 
While migration and mobility can, if properly managed, contribute to the reduction of poverty in 
developing countries, proper attention is now also being paid to minimising the negative side-
effects of the EU migration policy.
67
 In particular, in line with the Policy Coherence for 
Development commitments, the EU and its Member States must pay due attention to the possible 
downsides of migration, notably its social costs and the risks of households becoming dependent on 
income from remittances. 
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2.2.2. Progress on remittance outflows 
According to the latest estimations of the World Bank
68
, recorded
69
 global remittances flows to 
developing countries are estimated at EUR 267.5 billion (USD 372 billion) in 2011, an increase of 
12.1% over 2010, and are expected to grow at a rate of 7-8 % annually to reach EUR 333.5 billion 
(USD 467 billion) by 2014. 
 
As shown in the graph below, global remittance flows have been growing steadily during the crisis 
in comparison to other private resource flows. However remittances from the EU have kept 
momentum since 2008
70
. 
 
Figure 2.2.2 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2012
71 
 
At EU level, total EU27 remittance outflows amounted to EUR 31.2 billion in 2010, a 3% increase 
from last year (EUR 30.4 billion in 2009), most of which are sent to developing countries.  
According to Eurostat
72
, the outflow of workers' remittances was highest in 2010 in Spain (EUR 
7.2 billion or 23% of total EU27 remittances), Italy (6.6 billion or 21%), Germany (3.0 billion or 
10%), France (2.9 billion or 9%), the Netherlands (1.5 billion or 5%) and Greece (1.1 billion or 
3%). Among these Member States, the share of extra-EU27 remittances in the total ranged between 
67% in Germany and 91% in Greece. In 2010, the majority of Member States recorded similar 
levels of outflows of workers' remittances to 2009. 
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2.2.3. Reducing transfer costs of remittances 
At the Cannes G20 Summit in November 2011, G20 members agreed to reduce the average cost of 
transferring remittances from 10% to 5% of the amount transferred by 2014.
73
  
Although remittance costs have fallen steadily in recent years, they remain high, especially in 
Africa.  
Figure 2.2.3 
 
Source: World Bank, 2011
74
 
As seen in figure 2.2.3 above, remittance costs on average continue to remain high, impacting many 
poor migrants and their families. Efforts to reduce remittance costs include increasing market 
competition in many remittance corridors and wider application of cheaper and more convenient 
remittance technology. Also there is a great need to improve data on remittances and migration at 
the national and bilateral corridor levels, for more accurate monitoring of progress towards the 
agreed objective. It is estimated that reducing these costs to an average of 5 % (compared to the 
current average, which is roughly twice that) would save EUR 10.8 billion (USD 15 billion).
75
 
At EU level, remittance services are being made cheaper, more transparent, more competitive 
and more reliable. 
In particular, the transposition of the 2007 Payment Services Directive (PSD) into the national 
legislation of a majority of EU Member States has contributed to increased transparency in the 
provision of payment services, including the remittance market. Moreover, several EU Member 
States (including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have set up 
their own remittance price comparison websites on costs and quality of services. The above 
mentioned (par. 2.2.1.) study launched by the European Commission will include elements to assess 
the feasibility of a common EU portal on Remittances. 
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2.2.4. Donor initiatives 
Several EU Member States such as Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands have either 
launched or supported the launch of studies and workshops aimed at improving the knowledge 
about the main remittance channels and payment systems. For instance, France has funded a 
study on “Reducing the costs of migrants’ remittance and optimising their impact on development 
remittance channels from France to Maghreb and the ‘franc’ area”, the results of which were 
presented in February 2012.
76
 The recommendations of the study, carried out by the credit 
institution “Epargne sans Frontières” (Savings without Borders) and co-financed by AfDB and the 
French Development Agency, centred on cutting the cost of migrant money transfers and boosting 
their effect on the development of African countries. 
A number of EU Member States (including Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Poland) have also taken specific actions in 2011 aiming at increasing remittances’ channelling 
to productive and social investments. For example, Germany is in the process of setting up a 
social lending and knowledge brokerage project aiming at offering migrants a systematic way of 
collecting and spending remittances as well as sharing knowledge on small enterprise development 
or social investment in their countries of origin.  
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3. LEVERAGIG ITERATIOAL DEVELOPMET FIACE: BEYOD OFFICIAL, BEYOD 
DEVELOPMET AD BEYOD ASSISTACE 
3.1. Innovative Financing – Sources and Mechanisms 
EU Commitments 
● Council Conclusions of 14 June 2010
77
 (§31): Innovative financing sources and mechanisms 
complement other resources. The EU seriously considers proposals for innovative financing 
mechanisms with significant revenue generation potential, with a view to ensuring predictable 
financing for sustainable development, especially towards the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries. The EU calls on all parties to significantly step up efforts in this regard, welcomes the 
ongoing work by the Leading Group on innovative Financing for Development, and takes note of 
the ongoing work of the Task Force on International Financial Transactions for Development and 
of the Task Force on Innovative financing for Education. 
● Council Conclusions of 14 3ovember 2011
78
 (§3.5): Engage the private sector in aid and 
development effectiveness in order to advance innovation, create income and jobs, mobilise 
domestic resources and further develop innovative financial mechanisms. (§52): The EU calls (…) 
on development partners to further develop and increase the use of innovative financial instruments 
and blending of grants and loans that enhance the catalytic role of aid in promoting private sector 
engagement and private sector development. 
● Busan partnership for effective development cooperation, December 2011
79
 (§32. C): Further 
develop innovative financial mechanisms to mobilise private finance for shared development goals. 
 
In the current context of financial crisis and budgetary austerity, discussions on innovative 
financing mechanisms have gained a new resonance, both within the EU and at global level. A 
good illustration of this growing interest in innovative financing mechanisms is the G20’s formal 
agreement for the first time to support innovative financing for development and climate change 
and to move forward by using a menu of options.
80
 
 
According to the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development
81
, which is the main 
recognised international forum for discussions on this matter, about twenty countries in the world 
have already set up one or more innovative financing mechanisms so far. Thanks to these 
mechanisms, close to EUR 4.3 billion (USD 6 billion) have been raised since 2006.
82
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At the 10
th
 Plenary Session of the Leading Group, which took place in Madrid in February 
2012, the emphasis was put on the important advocacy role of the Leading Group in multilateral 
fora. Following the successful experience in 2010 at the UNHLPM on MDGs, the Leading Group 
organised another high-level side event in the context of the Rio+20 Conference, in partnership with 
the United Nations, in order to raise awareness on the potential of innovative financing mechanisms 
to mobilise resources for sustainable development. 
 
3.1.1. Distinction between innovative financing sources and mechanisms  
There is no universally accepted definition of Innovative Financing Mechanisms
83
 (IFM). While the 
term initially referred to new sources of development financing that could complement traditional 
ODA
84
 in a stable and predictable way
85
, it has progressively been expanded to include new and 
innovative financial mechanisms aiming at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of financial 
flows.  
The main characteristic of these mechanisms is that they differ from traditional approaches to 
mobilising and/or delivering development finance. They are usually complementary to traditional 
ODA and tend to address a specific negative externality.  
IFM are thus mechanisms that (i) support fund-raising by tapping new sources and engaging 
investors beyond the financial dimension of transactions, as partners and stakeholders in 
development; and/or (ii) deliver financial solutions to development problems on the ground. They 
can therefore be considered "innovative" either because of the nature of sources, the way they are 
collected and used, or their modes of governance.  
Broadly speaking, IFM can be divided into innovations in fund-raising and innovative financial 
solutions for development: 
Mechanisms that generate additional financing for development by tapping into new and innovative 
finance (or funding) sources (non-traditional or non-conventional ODA resources, 
emerging donors and the private sector). For example, global solidarity levies (such as the 
airline ticket tax or the Adaptation Fund) or national lotteries. 
Mechanisms that offer innovative financial instruments/solutions in the way revenues are 
collected and pooled, traditional development finance is used and aid is delivered. For 
example, public-private partnerships such as the International Finance Facility for 
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Immunisation (IFFIm), or copayment schemes such as the Advance Market Commitment 
(AMC) mechanism. 
 
According to a World Bank working paper
86
, four types of innovative mechanisms can be 
distinguished: 
– Private mechanisms: they involve private-to-private flows in the market and in civil 
society.  
– Solidarity mechanisms: they include public-to-public or sovereign-to-sovereign transfers 
and form the backbone of multilateral and bilateral ODA and other official flows (OOF).  
– Public-private partnership mechanisms: they use public funds to leverage or mobilise 
private finance in support of public service delivery and other public functions, such as risk 
management.  
– Catalytic mechanisms: they involve public support for creating and developing private 
markets (inter alia by reducing risks of private entry).  
 
3.1.2. State of play and revenues raised by existing innovative mechanisms 
Twelve Member States are currently using or are planning to use one or more of the existing 
innovative financing mechanisms to raise funds for development
87
.  
For example: 
• International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm): Six Member States (France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) indicated that they are contributing to the IFFIm under 
the GAVI Alliance. It is estimated that a total of EUR 2.4 billion (USD 3,4 billion) were levied 
through this mechanism for GAVI between 2006 and 2011
88
. 
• EU Emission Trading System89 (ETS): Four Member States (Czech Republic, France, Germany 
and Hungary) indicated that they are using or considering using the auctioning of allowances 
under the ETS with a view to financing climate action in developing countries. In that context, 
Germany also explicitly targets climate adaptation activities that have biodiversity co-benefits. 
• Air ticket levy: France is the only EU Member State to have introduced an air ticket levy to 
finance UNITAID, IFFIm and the Global Fund. France estimates that EUR 175.8 million will 
have been raised through this mechanism in 2011. Cyprus, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK are 
also supporting UNITAID
90
, albeit with direct contributions from their general budgets
91
.  
• Advance Market Commitments (AMC): Two Member States (Italy, UK) participate in the AMC 
for the development and production of affordable vaccines (France indicated its support for this 
mechanism without contributing to it at this stage). In 2011, Italy and the UK have contributed 
to this mechanism by more than EUR 79 million (compared to 55 million in 2010). 
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• Debt2Health: Germany is the only Member State participating in this initiative, which it is using 
for the Global Fund to fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In 2011, Germany contributed with 
EUR 3.3 million under this debt swap mechanism. 
• 3ational Lotteries: Belgium is the only Member State having declared the use of receipts from 
its national lottery to finance development cooperation. Part of the receipts (EUR 18.3 million) 
are earmarked for financing food security projects through the Belgian Fund for Food Security. 
 
3.1.3. Major EU initiatives 
At EU level, two recent initiatives are worth underlining. 
First, the Commission's “Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial 
transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC”
92
, which proposes setting up a harmonised 
framework for financial transaction tax in the EU. Such a tax, if adopted, would be levied as a rule 
on all financial transactions relating to financial instruments when at least one party to the 
transaction is established in a Member State and a financial institution established in a Member 
State is involved in the transaction. The idea of an EU FTT is strongly debated among Member 
States with very differing views. Discussions are currently on-going in the Council and the 
European Parliament in order to look at all the aspects of the proposal and their implications in 
practice. 
The financial transaction tax was proposed as a new own resource for the EU budget, in the context 
of the preparation of the next multiannual financial framework 2014-2020. The Commission has 
recently announced that, if adopted as a new own resource of the EU budget, the financial 
transaction tax could significantly reduce the contributions of Member States to the EU budget, in 
the magnitude of EUR 54 billion by 2020.
93
 
Second, the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to aviation transport, 
the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. As foreseen in 
the Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC, aviation activities are since January 2012 included in the 
emissions from all domestic and international flights that arrive at or depart from an EU airport.
94
 
While these two initiatives do not foresee earmarking of resources for development per se, they are 
nonetheless expected to facilitate Member States' efforts to mobilise funding required for meeting 
aid targets and tackling other global challenges. 
 
3.1.4. EU Blending Mechanisms 
The EU blending mechanisms are an innovative financing mechanism as they leverage additional 
resources and investments in a context of constrained resources. In particular, involving the private 
sector as a partner in development to create jobs and income opportunities for the poor, as well as to 
leverage additional funding through blending for achieving inclusive and sustainable growth, has 
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been recognised by the ‘Agenda for Change’, the ‘Busan Outcome document on Aid Effectiveness’ 
and has become common practice in development finance. 
 
The EU blending mechanisms combine grants with additional flows (such as loans and risk capital) 
to gain financial and qualitative leverage, and increase EU development policy impact. The 
strategic use of a grant element can make projects and initiatives by public or commercial investors 
financially viable, thereby exerting a leveraged policy impact. The grant element may take various 
forms such as: direct investment grants; interest rate subsidies; technical assistance, risk capital and 
risk sharing mechanisms such as guarantees.
95
 Beyond unlocking additional project financing, the 
EU grant element also reduces the price of the project for the beneficiary and contributes to 
complying with debt sustainability criteria. 
 
Since 2007, the EU has set up a number of regional blending facilities: the EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) and Investment Facilities for the Neighbourhood (NIF), Latin 
America (LAIF) and Central Asia. Since 2007, more than EUR 760 million EU grants have been 
committed to 115 projects. EU grant contributions have leveraged approximately EUR 10 billion of 
loans by European Finance Institutions, unlocking total project financing volume totalling in at least 
EUR 26 billion. With three new facilities for Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific, worldwide 
coverage is expected in 2012. 
 
3.2. Facilitating Private Investment  
EU Commitments 
Current EU thinking on engaging with the private sector is set out in the following Council 
Conclusions: 
• 3ovember 2008 Conclusions on a Common EU position for the Doha Financing for 
Development Conference
96
, §10: “The EU is committed to promote policies and instruments 
supporting private investment and the expansion of partner countries' private sector in support 
of an inclusive and sustainable economic growth”. 
• December 2011 Conclusions on Reinforcing industrial policy across the EU97: The Council 
welcomed the Communication from the Commission “A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-2014 for 
Corporate Social Responsibility as well as of the Social Business Initiative. 
 
3.2.1. Framework for Private sector-led growth 
As emphasised in the recent Communication on ‘Increasing the impact of EU Development policy: 
an Agenda for Change’
98
, “inclusive and sustainable economic growth is crucial to long-term 
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poverty reduction”. In many developing countries, the expansion of the private sector, notably 
micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) is a powerful engine of economic growth 
and the main source of job creation. Foreign investment also plays an important role, including 
through the linkages of domestic firms to international markets and through investments in 
infrastructure and natural resource based activities. One of the main challenges for governments in 
developing countries is to establish, design and implement institutional, organisational and 
regulatory frameworks which are conducive to, and often a pre-condition for, private sector 
development. Governments alone cannot create a private sector with an enterprise culture, but their 
actions can either hinder or facilitate it. The latter often requires far-reaching economic reforms 
aimed at improving the investment climate and facilitating access to finance.  
A framework for private sector-led growth is incorporated within the ‘Agenda for Change’. It 
advocates for inclusive and sustainable economic growth, resulting in wealth and job creation 
through inter alia an increased focus on:  
• Key drivers for inclusive and sustainable growth, notably a stronger business environment and 
deeper regional integration. This will be achieved by: (a) supporting the development of 
competitive local private sectors including by building local institutional and business capacity, 
and promoting MSMEs; (b) facilitating legislative and regulatory framework reforms and their 
enforcement; (c) improving access to business and financial services; (d) promoting agricultural, 
industrial and innovation policies; (e) developing new ways of engaging with the private sector, 
notably with a view to leveraging private sector activity and resources for delivering public 
goods; (f) extending the scope and scale of the EU regional blending facilities to further 
leverage addition financial resources for development; and (g) encouraging regional and 
continental integration efforts.  
• Sectors which build the foundations for growth and help to ensure that it is inclusive and 
sustainable, notably education, health, employment, and social protection; and on those sectors 
that have a strong multiplier impact on developing countries’ economies and contribute to 
environmental protection, climate change prevention and adaptation, notably sustainable 
agriculture and energy. EU support would help insulating developing countries from shocks and 
thus help provide the foundations for sustainable growth. It should tackle inequalities, in 
particular to give poor people better access to land, food, water and energy without harming the 
environment. In both sectors, the EU should support capacity development and technology 
transfer. 
The recent 4
th
 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan provided further impetus for the 
above approach. It highlighted the need for inclusion of new actors on the basis of shared 
principles and differential commitments, including the private sector. In particular, it 
recognised the central role of the private sector in advancing innovation, creating wealth, income 
and jobs, mobilising domestic resources and in turn contributing to poverty reduction. To this end, 
the meeting put forward a framework
99
 to enable the participation of the private sector in the design 
and implementation of development policies and strategies to foster sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction.  
The EU promotes foreign and domestic investments, especially for MSMEs, through its support for 
private sector development in developing countries. The vast majority of EU support is provided 
through bilateral cooperation programmes, the remainder being through regional programmes 
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(including all ACP programmes
100
). In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB) is entrusted 
with the management of the Investment Facility (IF) provided from the EU Member States' budgets 
via the European Development Fund (EDF). The IF, alongside the EIB own resources, meets the 
financing needs of investment projects in the ACP region with a broad range of loans and flexible 
risk-bearing instruments. In line with the EU Development Policy objectives, the EIB’s overriding 
aim is to support projects that deliver sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits 
through: supporting responsible private and public investments; fostering regional cooperation and 
integration; mobilising domestic savings and acting as a catalyst for foreign direct investment; 
encouraging the broadening, deepening and strengthening of the local financial sector; and relying 
on/promoting partnerships. 
Private flows, notably foreign direct investments, play an important role within the above approach 
and contribute to provision of needed capital.
101
 However, this source of financing from the EU27 
has been limited in recent years. According to Eurostat, net FDI from the EU27 to developing 
countries peaked in 2007 and declined in 2008 before growing in 2009. As shown in Figure 3.2.1
102
 
below, FDI fell significantly in 2010, reaching a level last observed in 2005. The decline in FDI 
from the EU, together with resource constraints faced by developing countries, underscores the 
importance for EU Member States to help mobilise a critical mass of investments in developing 
countries. 
Figure 3.2.1 – et FDI Flows from EU to Developing Countries (EUR billion, current prices) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
3.2.1.1. Business and Investment Climate  
Investment climate encompasses economic, institutional, financial and market conditions affecting 
investment and business operations. It is determined by the legal and regulatory framework, 
existence of barriers to entry and exit, and conditions in markets for labour, finance, information, 
infrastructure services, and other productive inputs. It is thus a cross-cutting issue that affects all 
aspects of private sector development. For instance, a typical MSME programme not only 
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addresses access to finance issues but targets improvements in aspects of the investment climate 
that especially affects the sector.  
In developing countries, a conducive investment climate is therefore an important determinant of 
private sector investment and growth. The EU supports the improvement of the macroeconomic 
framework and regulatory environment for enterprise development through bilateral cooperation 
and regional programmes like the Intra-ACP programme “Private Sector Enabling Environment 
Facility of the Business Environment
103
 (PSEEF / BizClim)”. Several EU Member States are also 
active in this area, such as Austria, Netherlands and Germany who work closely with partner 
countries and donors to improve the business investment climate. Other examples worth mentioning 
include:  
• The Belgian Development Cooperation aims at improving the business and investment climate 
in developing countries by supporting UNDP, the World Bank and Transparency International 
in their efforts. These are embedded into the bilateral cooperation in countries such as Burundi, 
Rwanda and DRC.  
• The UK provides financing for technical assistance and research to improve the investment 
climate and strengthen growth policies in developing countries. Both are critical for supporting 
private investment. This assistance helps transform policies, legislation, regulations and 
government administration to become more efficient and predictable which helps create a more 
conducive environment for private investment.  
3.2.1.2. Financial Services for trade and investment 
Financial mechanisms aimed at supporting private sector development usually tackle two inter-
related issues of cost and access. The type of funding and the repayment terms are both key 
determinants on the cost side. Blending of grants with market-based financing is thus a way to 
reduce costs, especially for investment with long gestation period and with social rates of return 
well above the financial rate of return. While other measures such as guarantees help address both 
issues, other mechanisms discussed below help improve access.  
The European Commission uses blending mechanisms, in which grants are combined with non-
grant financing such as loans and risk capital as a way to leverage additional private and public 
financing for developmental projects. The strategic use of a grant element and risk-sharing 
mechanisms may also catalyse public-private partnerships and crowd-in private investment. 
The potential range of financial tools used in the EU blending mechanisms includes: technical 
assistance (TA); investment co-financing; interest rate subsidies; risk-capital operations and risk-
sharing mechanisms such as guarantees. To date the EU regional blending facilities have covered 
similar broadly defined, sectors, i.e. transport, energy, social, water/wastewater, environment, ICT 
and access to finance for MSMEs. Partners in the beneficiary country can be public or private, with 
public partners dominating the current projects aside from MSME support. 
The European Commission also plays an active role in the sector approach, mainly through Trust 
Funds in cooperation with Member States.  
Box 3.2.1.2 Example of Blending Mechanisms 
The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF) is an innovative Fund-of-Funds, providing 
global risk capital through private investment for energy efficiency and renewable energy projects in developing 
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countries and economies in transition. Launched in 2004, GEEREF aims to accelerate the transfer, development, use 
and enforcement of environmentally sound technologies for the world's poorer regions, helping to bring secure, clean 
and affordable energy to local people. GEEREF is sponsored by the European Union, Germany and Norway and 
advised by the European Investment Bank Group.  
Support to the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) promotes private sector 
development in the Mediterranean region by providing capital to the private sector on terms that are not available 
locally. This is done mainly through risk capital operations and facilitated through technical assistance. Managed by the 
EIB, the Support to FEMIP’s risk-capital portfolio includes more than 500 operations.  
Guarantee mechanisms can reduce risk and enhance access to finance. Such mechanisms can be 
put in place to promote trade and investment. These instruments are managed and implemented by 
specialised agencies within EU Member States. Most Member States have established banks for this 
purpose, including Romania, Hungary and Slovakia’s Eximbanks, also Estonia’s Fund KredEx and 
the Latvian Guarantee agency. Austria, Estonia, Hungary and Italy are also amongst the countries 
that also provide political risk insurance and/or investment guarantees. The case of Austria helps 
illustrate how such schemes work. The Austrian export credit agency, assumes guarantees for 
political risks. The “Austria Wirtschaftsservice” (AWS) assumes investment guarantees which 
cover the commercial risk of Austrian private investments abroad. Being an Austrian government 
promoted bank, it is the key focus of AWS international activities, to support the establishment and 
formation of subsidiaries and joint ventures or to enable the acquisition of companies abroad
104
. 
Finally, MSME access to finance can be improved through the strengthening of the financial 
sector and most Member States also have on-going, mutually reinforcing programmes supporting 
private sector development through improved access to finance. The insufficient availability of 
term finance may hinder the ability of the financial sector in many developing countries to fund 
investments through medium-term to long-term loans targeting MSMEs and larger private projects. 
Donors address this problem by providing term resources on both commercial and concessional 
terms, including through the provision of lines of credit and/or equity funding and guarantees. 
Further, the lack of capacity and/or know-how at the level of the financial intermediaries as well as 
beneficiaries may affect implementation of lines of credit, equity and guarantee funds. Donors thus 
often use a small part of the resource envelope to provide complementary technical assistance. 
Some of these programmes are quite broad in type and coverage. For example, Germany cooperates 
bilaterally with over 70 partner countries in over 200 programmes to advance financial sector 
development, including the banking sector. It is active in several international initiatives that aim at 
improving the overall banking system, e.g. Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Initiative 
(FIRST), Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP, an 
independent policy and research centre dedicated to advancing financial access for the world's poor 
also funded by the EU), and Access to Insurance Initiative (A2II). Other EU Member States 
reported activities in these areas are: 
• Germany co-chairs the working group on SME Finance in the G20 Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion, particularly aiming at improving access to finance for SMEs in developing 
countries also focusing on improving access for agricultural enterprises and women 
entrepreneurs. Germany contributes to the Partnership for Making Finance Work for Africa. 
Jointly with other donors, the regional MSME Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa (REGMIFA
105
) and 
SANAD
106
 (set up in 2011, also with EU funding) in the MENA region aims to enhance long 
                                                 
104
 While there is a general agreement that guarantees link to a development project have a positive impact, the value of 
this approach if supply driven needs to be assessed on case by case basis.  
105
 http://www.regmifa.com/ 
106
 http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.11.170553/ 
EN 44   EN 
and medium financial needs of local financial intermediaries. The AATIF
107
 fund invests in the 
agricultural sector in Africa with a focus on agricultural value chains. The European Fund for 
Southeast Europe
108
 (EFSE) provides sustainable funding to entrepreneurs and private 
households in Southeast Europe. 
• The Austrian Development Bank (OeEB) supports the private sector in developing countries by 
providing long-term finance on commercial terms. Particular attention is given to the financing 
of micro finance institutions in partner countries. Additional technical support to projects is 
funded separately, but usually linked to financing provided by OeEB.  
• Italy provides grants and loans to support investments in developing countries including 
Lebanon, Serbia, Albania, Jordan, Tunisia, Afghanistan, India, Senegal, Ghana, Uruguay, 
Vietnam and Iraq. 
• Portugal provides long-term finance for upgrade, expansion or new agricultural, industrial, 
tourism, infrastructural and financial projects from private companies, in Portuguese Speaking 
African countries, Northern Africa, Latin America and Asia. 
• The Danida Business Finance109 facility is an example of term credit that targets the 
infrastructure sector while promoting climate-friendly and clean technology development 
projects. A minimum investment of EUR 1 million is eligible and interest-free or low-interest 
loans are extended.  
• Luxembourg provides TA to support activities and institutions in the financial sector. 
• The Belgian Development Cooperation supports micro finance activities, notably in Morocco, 
Rwanda, Senegal and Vietnam. Latvia funds loans for the development MSMEs and Co-
operative Unions Providing Agricultural Services. Sweden extends equity and loans also to 
SMEs primarily through the Swedish Swedfund. 
•  “The Currency Exchange” (TCX), supported by Germany, France and others, provides 
market risk management products in developing and emerging markets by focusing on 
currencies and maturities which are not covered by regular market providers. 
• Greece provides subsidies to private productive investments in the framework of 
implementation of the “Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans”. 
• Finnfund is a Finnish development financing institution that offers long-term risk funding for 
commercially profitable investments in developing and transition countries. 
• The UK uses a range of financial instruments to catalyse private investment in developing 
countries. Instruments include grants to support activities such as capacity building and seed 
funding channelled through their challenge funds; risk-sharing instruments including equity, 
debt and guarantees deployed through intermediaries such as the Private Infrastructure 
Development Group. The UK also supports private investment through shareholdings in CDC 
and the Investment Finance Corporation. 
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• France provides a guarantee fund for Sub-Saharan SMEs, which are estimated to have 
contributed to the creation of 90,000 jobs, as well as investment finance through FISEA
110
 and 
AFD loans. AFD also supports upscaling of microfinance institution and downscaling of bank to 
better serve MSMEs.  
3.2.1.3. Access to finance programmes 
Most of the access to finance programmes aims to facilitate availability of financing to the MSME 
sector. Programmes reported by Member States are:  
• The Belgian Development Cooperation supports micro finance activities, notably in 
Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal and Vietnam. Latvia funds loans for the development MSMEs 
and Co-operative Unions Providing Agricultural Services. Sweden extends equity and 
loans also to SMEs primarily through the Swedish Swedfund. 
• Germany co-chairs the working group on SME Finance in the G20 Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion, particularly aiming at improving access to finance for SMEs in 
developing countries also focusing on improving access for agricultural enterprises and 
women entrepreneurs. Germany contributes to the Partnership for Making Finance Work 
for Africa. Jointly with other donors, the regional MSME Fund for Sub-Saharan Africa 
(REGMIFA
111
) and SANAD
112
 (set up in 2011, also with EU funding) in the MENA 
region aims to enhance long and medium financial needs of local financial intermediaries. 
The AATIF
113
 fund invests in the agricultural sector in Africa with a focus on agricultural 
value chains. The European Fund for Southeast Europe
114
 (EFSE) provides sustainable 
funding to entrepreneurs and private households in Southeast Europe. 
• France provides a guarantee fund for Sub-Saharan SMEs, which are estimated to have 
contributed to the creation of 90,000 jobs, as well as investment finance through FISEA
115
 
and AFD loans. AFD also supports upscaling of microfinance institution and downscaling 
of bank to better serve MSMEs.  
3.2.1.4. Support for Public-Private Partnerships for the delivery of goods and services  
A Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a partnership between the public and the private sector for the 
purpose of delivering a project or a service traditionally provided by the public sector. PPPs 
leverage private funding, can draw on the operational efficiencies of the private sector, allow faster 
implementation and can enhance the quality of the service delivered. PPPs may be especially 
important in poorer countries where over-extended governments do not have the human 
resources and fiscal space to fulfil the requirements of their growing economy. It should be 
noted that PPPs can take many forms, ranging from private investment in the sector concerned and 
private provision of service, with regulatory oversight provided by a specialised public institution, 
to some type of “enhanced lease” where the operator is only responsible for service delivery and 
part of the maintenance. Another feature of PPPs is that they are typically time-bound. PPPs are 
usually undertaken in infrastructure, even though there is growing opportunities in social sectors 
and other developmental activities. 
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The Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) is a multidonor organisation
116
, 
including Austria, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. It was established in 2002 to 
promote private participation in infrastructure in developing countries with a strong focus on Africa. 
It provides long-term capital and local currency guarantees, and TA. The Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)
117
 is a multi-donor technical assistance facility, set up in 
1999 and financed by 17 multilateral and bilateral donors including Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and United Kingdom. It is a complementary scheme to deliver technical 
assistance to developing country governments.  
In terms of bilateral initiatives, AFD supports PPPs through funding of concessions and enhanced 
leases, including in the education and vocational training sector. Complementary TA may also be 
provided. The UK is investing £130 million in a Climate Public Private Partnership (CP3). CP3 will 
support projects delivering renewable and efficient energy, new technology and protect natural 
resources in emerging and developing countries including Africa and Asia. 
3.2.1.5. Other partnerships 
Complementary measures used by donors to promote private investments include matching-grants 
and match-making for know-how and technological acquisitions and upgrading, and technical 
assistance and studies. The following related activities have been reported by Member States:  
• German Development Cooperation co-finances feasibility studies and accompanying measures 
for foreign direct investments in developing countries. It also supports foreign direct 
investments by SMEs and PPPs through subsidies to cover the administrative costs for advisory 
services, project review, etc.  
• Danida’s Business Partnerships, Finnpartnership and Austria partnership initiative facilitate the 
establishment of commercial partnerships that have a significant impact on development in poor 
communities.  
• The Finnish business-to-business partnership programme allocates funding for long-term 
partnerships between Finnish and developing country entities, normally companies. Partnerships 
must contribute to development. Forms of business partnerships are e.g. long-term trade 
partnership, investment and joint venture. 
• France provides grants funded TA complementary to investment projects, as well as various 
TA to financial institutions. Capacity building is offered to enterprises, including upgrading to 
international norms, and for trade. 
 
3.2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
CSR concerns the impact of companies on society. It has become an increasingly important 
concept and is part of the debate about globalisation, climate change, competitiveness and social 
and environmental sustainability. CSR practices are not a substitute for public policy, but they can 
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contribute to a number of public policy objectives in developing countries, especially in relation to 
labour markets, labour standards, skills development, more rational use of natural resources and 
overall poverty reduction. Developing countries benefit from good practices in CSR in a number of 
ways notably through the better quality of development and increased private and public financial 
flows.  
3.2.2.1. A renewed EU Policy on Corporate Social Responsibility 
On 25 October 2011 the European Commission issued a new CSR Communication
118
 which 
was welcomed by the Council of the European Union in its Conclusions on “Reinforcing Industrial 
Policy in the EU”.
119
 In particular, the Council encouraged Member States to develop or update 
their plans and/or priority actions in this area, and recognised CSR as a voluntary assumption of 
social responsibility.  
The CSR Communication states that to fully meet their social responsibility, enterprises “should 
have in place a process to integrate social, environmental, and ethical and human rights concerns 
into their business operations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders”. 
The aim is both to enhance positive impacts – for example through the innovation of new products 
and services that are beneficial to society and enterprises themselves – and to minimise and prevent 
negative impacts.  
The Communication puts forward an action agenda for the period 2011-2014 covering 8 
areas: 
• Enhancing the visibility of CSR and disseminating good practices. 
• Improving and tracking levels of trust in business. 
• Improving self- and co-regulation processes. 
• Enhancing market reward for CSR by leveraging EU policies in relevant fields.  
• Improving company disclosure of social and environmental information. 
• Further integrating CSR into education, training and research. 
• Emphasising the importance of national and sub-national CSR policies: EU Member States to 
present or update their own plans for the promotion of CSR by mid-2012
120
. 
• Better aligning European and global approaches.  
The new European strategy on CSR makes reference to a number of international initiatives. 
Among these are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The Guidelines
121
 were 
updated in 2011 and include chapters on human rights, due diligence and responsible supply chain 
management, and important changes in many specialised chapters, such as on Employment and 
Industrial Relations; Combating Bribery, Bribe Solicitation and Extortion, Environment, Consumer 
Interests, Disclosure and Taxation. There is also guidance to strengthen the mediating role of the 
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http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/files/csr/new-csr/act_en.pdf  
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Union, dated November 2010. Further insights may be found in a report by CSR Europe (network of 70 multinationals 
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National Contact Points and a pro-active implementation agenda. EU and some Member States 
contributed to this document.
122
 
Other important international initiatives to which the European Commission participates, are the 
UN Guiding Principles on business and human rights
123
 (the "protect, respect, remedy" framework), 
in respect of which the Commission will provide a priorities report for the end of 20120), the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy
124
, and the UN's Global 
Compact.
125
 
3.2.2.2. Update on activities relating to CSR  
The EU and a majority of Member States undertook/continued national action to promote CSR 
principles, and 15 of them, including the Commission, report on-going or new activities in this area. 
In addition to areas already reported in the 2011 Accountability Report, there are a variety of other 
activities with important contribution to the financing for development agenda supported by 
Member States: 
The UK food retail Industry Challenge Fund aims to increase African farmers and farm worker 
incomes through access to international food supply chains, including ethical and fair trade. The UK 
also expanded the operations of the Business Innovation Facility with an increased focus on lesson 
learning on inclusive business. 
The Austrian Government supports private sector projects on CSR activities and on setting 
up/strengthening of value chains. 
The etherlands funds a small pilot-programme for 50 international CSR-vouchers. These 
vouchers give SME’s a reduction (50% with a maximum of EUR 10,000) in the fee of a CSR-
consultant for advice on how to encourage CSR in the supply chain in developing countries. 
Initiatives contributing to better aligning approaches to CSR included (a) UN Global Compact; 
continued support to its secretariat was provided by Denmark, mandate of local group was renewed 
by Latvia, and Italy hosted a meeting of local European Networks; (b) the UN Guiding Principles 
signed by Spain in 2011; and (c) the ISO 26000; capacity building in this area in favour of 19 Latin 
America countries was funded by Germany in November 2011 and self-evaluation was undertaken 
by 50 Latvian enterprises.  
Strategic, training and dissemination activities by Member States during 2011 included: (a) an 
Organisational Capacity Assessment Instrument (OCAI) to support companies in Germany and 
worldwide to adopt the new UN-principles on business and human rights, and the promotion of the 
new OECD-Guidelines for Multinational Companies in German; (b) approval of the work plan for 
the Spanish CSR working group; (c) Employers’ Confederation of Latvia with support of organised 
business society and European Social Fund organised a social campaign “Against shadow economy 
– for business competitiveness; and (d) national strategy to promote CSR, for the period 2011-2016 
has been adopted by the Romanian Government. 
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The EU is in the process of funding the fourth tranche of the SWITCH Asia Programme.
126
 Its 
aim is to promote Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) in Asia so as to minimise the use 
of natural resources and the emissions of greenhouse gases, waste and other pollutants. To achieve 
this objective, the Programme works simultaneously on the ground, with producers and consumers, 
and at the level of policy-making through supporting for formulation and implementation of SCP-
related policies. The allocation of the present tranche is about EUR 30 million. So far, the 
Programme is funding 47 projects in 15 Asian countries in areas such as Green Public Procurement, 
Cleaner Production, Eco-labelling, etc. Each of the funded projects will bring about quantifiable 
reductions of CO2 emissions and resource, water and energy consumption. In the area of policy 
enhancement four countries have already gathered experience in applying SCP tools. An example of 
this programme is illustrated in Box 3.2.2.2 below. 
Box 3.2.2.2 Green Philippines Islands of Sustainability (GPIoS)
127
 
The key objectives of GPIoS are to minimise the environmental impacts caused by SME's in the target region (Metro 
Manila and the Calabarzon region), by adopting preventive environmental production and to integrate sustainable 
growth, social progress and environmental protection within the businesses of participating companies. Partnership 
agreement was signed between GPIoS and Plantersbank last December 14, 2011.  
GPIoS will serve as a tool to increase profitability while being environmentally friendly, making SMEs more bankable. 
Results of the project show significant financial and environmental benefits: 
 Total energy savings can light up 47, 367 street lamps during one year 12 hours each day 
 The amount of water savings can fill 256 Olympic sized pool 
 The amount of waste avoided can fill up 23 garbage trucks 
 Return of Investment = 0.8 and Payback time of 9.6 months 
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4. ITERATIOAL DEVELOPMET FIACE: EU SUPPORT TO GLOBAL GOALS 
4.1. Scaling up Official Development Assistance (ODA)
128 
EU Commitments 
● In 2002, the EU Member States adopted joint commitments on ODA increases. These 
commitments were further developed and broadened, and endorsed by the European Council in 
2005 ahead of the U3 World Summit that undertook the first review of progress on the Millennium 
Declaration and the MDGs. The EU and its Member States agreed to achieve a collective ODA 
level of 0.7% of G3I by 2015 and an interim target of 0.56% by 2010, both accompanied by 
individual national targets. The EU Member States agreed to increase their ODA to 0.51% of their 
national income by 2010 while those countries which had already achieved higher levels (0.7% or 
above) promised to maintain these levels. The Member States that acceded to the EU in or after 
2004 (EU-12) promised to strive to spend 0.17% of their G3I on ODA by 2010 and 0.33% by 
2015.
129
 
● In addition the EU committed in 2005 to: (a) increase ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa and (b) 
provide 50% of the ODA increase to Africa as a whole (3orth Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa).  
● In 2008 the EU as a whole also committed to provide between 0.15 and 0.20% ODA/ G3I to the 
Least Developed Countries by 2010.
130
  
 
4.1.1. EU ODA Commitments in the Global Context 
Although the goal of allocating annually 0.7% of GNI to ODA is accepted by all DAC donors 
except the United States of America, only EU donors and Norway have set a date to achieve it, 
transforming the long-standing UN 0.7% goal, considered by many as aspirational, into a realistic, 
time-bound target. The EU decided to move forward and achieve this goal in steps within 15 years 
(2000 – 2015), in line with the deadlines of the Millennium Declaration and based on a mix of 
individual and collective intermediate targets. The first intermediate EU ODA objectives were 
defined in 2002 during the preparation for the Monterrey International Conference on Financing for 
Development, based on the EU’s ODA levels in 2000.  
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 The exact wording is as follows: ‘In the context of the commitment to attain the internationally agreed ODA target of 
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2015. European Council, 18 June 2005, Doc. 10255/05 Conc. 2. 
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4.1.2. EU ODA Performance 2005-2011 compared to other donors 
The EU has not only pledged to deliver more aid, but its combined efforts are already delivering 
substantially greater amounts of ODA than non EU donors, and individual EU countries (with a few 
exceptions) are also making more substantial efforts in relative terms.  
Figure 4.1.2 –ODA/GI by Donor (% and EUR million, current prices) 
 
Source: OECD DAC and European Commission 
As shown in Figure 4.1.2 and Table 4.1.2, both the EU’s per capita ODA and its ODA/GI 
ratios are greater than those of non-EU DAC Members. Indeed, its ODA/GNI ratio is more than 
double that of Japan and the USA. Collectively, the EU outperforms most other donors by a wide 
margin. The USA, Japan and Switzerland have higher per capita income than rge average for EU 
Member States but much lower per capita ODA. The US GNI is close to 90 % of the EU27 GNI, 
but US ODA is only 40 % of EU ODA. It is clear that most of the gap to achieving the global 0.7 % 
target is outside the EU.  
Table 4.1.2 – ODA/GI and ODA per capita of EU Member States and on-EU DAC Members  
ODA per capita (EUR) ODA/GNI (%) ODA (EUR Billion) 
Donor 
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 (E) 2009 2010 2011 (E) 
EU 98 107 105 0.42 0.44 0.42 49.2 53.5 53.1 
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Non EU DAC Members 68 79 78 0.23 0.23 0.23 37.7 44.4 44.0 
USA 67 74 71 0.21 0.21 0.20 20.7 22.9 22.1 
Japan 53 65 60 0.18 0.20 0.18 6.8 8.3 7.6 
Canada 85 115 111 0.30 0.34 0.31 2.9 3.9 3.8 
Source: OECD DAC/European Commission  
 
4.1.3. Performance on ODA targets (2005-2011) 
ODA figures on 2011 net disbursements are preliminary, based on information provided by EU 
Member States and the European Commission. For those EU Member States that report to the 
OECD/ DAC final and more comprehensive ODA figures will become available towards the end of 
2012. 
The EU collective ODA spending in 2011 was EUR 53,1 billion, which translates into the 
ODA/GI ratio decline from 0.44% in 2010 to 0.42%.
131
 The reduction in absolute terms was 
of EUR 342 million. 
Since making its ODA commitments in 2002, EU ODA has seen fluctuations, but overall has been 
on an upward trend. The growth of EU ODA is especially significant if one considers the declining 
importance of debt relief in the overall ODA effort of EU Member States. Over the period 1995-
2011, EU15 ODA net of debt relief grew by 0.07% of GNI from 0.34% in 1995 to 0.41% in 2011.  
Since 2008, the financial crisis has hit EU Member States hard, triggering the deepest global 
economic recession in decades. State-financed rescue packages for the affected banking sector, 
higher social protection costs and lower budget revenues have dramatically changed the fiscal 
situation in many Member States. Low or negative economic growth rates in the EU as a 
consequence of the crisis, and the related austerity measures that Member States introduced, led to 
different pressures on ODA. Due to economic contraction, the aid level could appear higher when 
expressed as a percentage of GNI, but provides no additional ODA funding for developing 
countries.  
Also, lower GNI growth combined with need for higher public expenditure elsewhere led to 
restrictions to spending on development cooperation. Through the first three years of the crisis, the 
EU continued aid increases, but succumbed to the pressure in 2011, resulting in a lower trajectory 
of scaling up to meet 2015 targets.  
The 2011 decline in ODA by EUR 342 million was the outcome of mixed performance by Member 
States. Eleven Member States reduced their ODA by a total of EUR 2.5 billion, while sixteen 
Member States increased their ODA in nominal terms by a total of EUR 2.2 billion. The biggest 
cuts in nominal terms were in Spain (1.4 billion), France (400 million), Belgium (250 million) and 
Greece (EUR 145 million). As a proportion of 2010 ODA, biggest cuts were in Greece (38%), 
Spain (32%) and Cyprus (29%).  
Biggest increases in nominal terms were in Italy (EUR 788 million), Germany (EUR 648 million) 
and Sweden (EUR 609 million). The ODA/GNI ratios of Germany and Italy are, respectively, over 
                                                 
131
  The final 2010 ODA/GNI ratio of 0.44% is 0.01 higher than the estimated ratio included in the 2011 EU 
Accountability Report due to revised GNI statistics. 
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20% and almost 70% below their individual targets for 2010. As a proportion of 2010 ODA, 
biggest increases were in Malta (43%), Romania (37%), Lithuania and Italy (35% both). We can 
note that all EU12 with the exception of Cyprus have either raised or maintained their aid levels, in 
part due to the fact that several contributed to the EDF for the first time. 
Looking at overall developments since 2004, all countries except Portugal and Greece saw their 
ODA/GNI ratio grow between 2004 and 2011 (see Annex 3 for details). For Germany, UK, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Malta, Estonia, 2011 was the highest or very close to the highest 
ODA/GNI ratio in the period. Sweden, Luxembourg, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Cyprus had grown 
above their 2011 level and then back-tracked a little but progress since 2004 has remained 
substantial. Denmark, Netherlands, France, Poland had grown above their 2011 level and then back-
tracked a little, with limited progress since 2004; Denmark and France had gone below their 2004 
level and recovered. ODA/GNI ratios of Spain, Austria, Italy grew well above their 2011 level and 
then back-tracked substantially so that progress since 2004 has been limited.  
 Figure 4.1.3 – Gap between 2015 targets and 2011 results  
 
Source: OECD DAC and European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on financing for development) 
 
In 2011, the EU Member States stand in different position with regard to 2015 target. Four EU 
Member States (Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) continue to exceed the 0.7% 
target, with Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden aiming to reach 1% of GNI by 2015. Despite 
stalling in 2011, the UK with 0.56% is above the linear track from 2010 target towards the 0.7% 
target. Belgium, Finland and Ireland are above the 2010 target of 0.51% of GNI, but below the 
linear track. With the exception of Malta, no EU12 Member State is above the 2010 ODA target 
(see figure Figure 4.1.3). 
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4.1.4. Achievement of the 0.7% ODA/G3I Target by 2015 
Based on the projections provided by Member States and/or estimates prepared using their 2006-
2011 compound annual growth rate,
132
 the EU27 ODA is expected to increase to 0.44% by 2015. 
Considering the expected GNI growth rate till 2015, reaching the 0.7% ODA/GNI target would 
require the EU and its Member States to dramatically step up efforts and almost double their current 
ODA in nominal terms. Figure 4.1.4 below shows the long-term trends in ODA volumes for the 
EU27. At the current pace, there is a delay equivalent to about 25 years on the path to 0.7%, as 
ODA is projected to increase at an annual rate of 0.01% of GNI.  
The EU scaling-up process has been uneven, with asymmetric efforts. Those Member States not 
contributing their fair share to the burden-sharing effort have kept the collective EU performance 
below the targets, and would also need to make the greatest efforts to reach the 2015 targets.  
Table 4.1.4a: Estimates and gaps to be bridged for reaching the 2015 ODA targets, based on Member States' 
forecast information and Commission simulation  
2015: Gap to 
meet 
national 
targets from 
2011 level
EUR 
Mill ion
% of 
GI
EUR 
Million
% of 
GI
EUR 
Mill ion
% of 
GI
EUR 
Mill ion
% of 
GI
EUR 
Mill ion
% of 
GI
EUR 
Mill ion
% of 
GI
EUR 
Mill ion
% of 
GI  EUR mill ion
Austria 912      0,32 796      0,27 1 469   0,47     1 361   0,42      1 523   0,46    1 404   0,41   2 384    0,70 1 587             
Belgium 2 268   0,64 2 014   0,53 2 172   0,56     2 040   0,51      2 083   0,50    2 972   0,70   2 977    0,70 964                
Bulgaria 31        0,09 35        0,09 36        0,09     43        0,10      51        0,12    61        0,14   149       0,33 114                
Cyprus 39        0,23 28        0,16 29        0,16     30        0,16      32        0,17    32        0,16   65         0,33 37                  
Czech Republic 172      0,13 184      0,13 184      0,13     182      0,12      194      0,13    209      0,13   533       0,33 349                
Denmark 2 168   0,91 2 144   0,86 2 093   0,82     2 189   0,83      2 240   0,83    2 324   0,84   2 782    1,00 638                
Estonia 14        0,10 18        0,12 21        0,13     23        0,14      27        0,15    30        0,17   60         0,33 42                  
Finland 1 006   0,55 1 013   0,52 1 124   0,56     1 129   0,54      1 134   0,52    1 160   0,52   1 563    0,70 550                
France 9 751   0,50 9 345   0,46 10 461 0,51     10 168 0,48      10 376 0,48    10 588 0,47   15 657  0,70 6 312             
Germany 9 804   0,39 10 452 0,40 10 728 0,40     11 230 0,41      11 757 0,42    12 307 0,42   20 288  0,70 9 836             
Greece 383      0,17 238      0,11 222      0,11     207      0,10      193      0,09    180      0,08   1 548    0,70 1 310             
Hungary 86        0,09 101      0,11 99        0,11     100      0,10      100      0,10    100      0,10   341       0,33 241                
Ireland 676      0,52 650      0,52 639      0,51     644      0,50      697      0,52    699      0,50   978       0,70 328                
Italy 2 262   0,15 3 050   0,19 1 880   0,12     2 755   0,17      2 783   0,17    2 811   0,16   12 086  0,70 9 036             
Latvia 12        0,06 14        0,07 16        0,07     17        0,08      18        0,08    20        0,08   79         0,33 65                  
Lithuania 28        0,10 38        0,13 43        0,14     48        0,14      55        0,16    62        0,17   118       0,33 81                  
Luxembourg 304      1,05 297      0,99 295      1,00     306      1,00      316      1,00    328      1,00   328       1,00 31                  
Malta 10        0,18 14        0,25 16        0,27     18        0,29      20        0,31    22        0,33   22         0,33 8                    
The Netherlands 4 800   0,81 4 698   0,78 4 424   0,72     4 463   0,70      4 674   0,71    4 917   0,72   4 781    0,70 83                  
Poland 285      0,08 300      0,08 309      0,08     325      0,08      341      0,08    357      0,08   1 389    0,33 1 089             
Portugal 490      0,29 481      0,29 471      0,29     513      0,31      558      0,33    607      0,35   1 219    0,70 738                
Romania 86        0,07 118      0,09 125      0,09     136      0,09      148      0,09    161      0,10   538       0,33 420                
Slovak Republic 56        0,09 62        0,09 69        0,10     66        0,09      67        0,09    69        0,09   260       0,33 198                
Slovenia 44        0,13 45        0,13 51        0,14     54        0,15      59        0,16    65        0,16   130       0,33 85                  
Spain 4 492   0,43 3 067   0,29 2 405   0,23 2 409   0,22      2 414   0,21    2 418   0,21   8 136    0,70 5 069             
Sweden 3 423   0,97 4 032   1,02 4 058   0,98     4 248   0,99      4 462   1,00    4 688   1,02   4 587    1,00 555                
UK 9 855   0,57 9 881   0,56 10 613 0,56     13 688 0,70      14 135 0,70    14 659 0,70   14 659  0,70 4 778             
EU 15 TO TAL 52 594 0,46 52 159 0,45 53 053 0,44     57 351 0,46      59 343 0,47    62 064 0,47   93 973  0,72 41 814           
EU 12 TO TAL 863      0,09 957      0,10 997      0,10     1 043   0,10      1 111   0,10    1 187   0,11   3 685    0,33 2 729             
EU 27 TO TAL 53 457 0,44 53 115 0,42 54 050 0,42     58 394 0,44      60 454 0,44    63 251 0,45   97 658  0,69 44 543           
Gap to collective 2015 target 0.7%
Target in EUR million: 99 481     
Gap in EUR million 46 366     
Member State 2015         
(commitments)
2011              
(pre liminary)
2012 (forecast/ 
simulation) 
2013 (forecast/ 
simulation) 
2014 (forecast/ 
simulation) 
2015 (forecast/ 
simulation) 2010
 
Shaded cells are Commission estimates 
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 Annex 2 outlines the methodology used to analyse ODA indicators and forecasts provided by Member States. 
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Table 4.1.4a shows the projections and the sometimes drastic increases needed by individual 
Member States in their budgets of 2012-2015. For example, to reach the 2015 target Latvia and 
Greece would need to sextuple their current ODA volumes over the next four years, Poland and 
Romania quintuple; Bulgaria, Italy, and the Slovak Republic would need to quadruple; and Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain would need to triple 
their aid allocations.  
The projections confirm that Member States do not plan to make these increases under the 
current tight budget conditions. 20 Member States provided some projections for their ODA in 
the coming years and 13 have provided projections up to 2015. Excluding 4 Member States that are 
already above 0.7% ODA/GNI, only Belgium, Malta and the United Kingdom foresee reaching 
their 2015 targets. Of the other 20 Member States, we foresee either lower pace of increases or even 
decreases, remaining far from the 2015 target. Based on these indications and the Commission 
projections, we expect 17 Member States to at least marginally increase their ODA/GNI ratio by 
2015, however remaining far from reaching their individual targets.  
For 2012, the projections based on Member Sates’ replies or budget data available online, point to a 
stagnation in ODA budgets. This is due in great part to significant ODA budget cuts in Spain, Italy, 
and the Netherlands (in order of magnitude), only partially compensated by relevant projected 
increases in the United Kingdom, France, and Austria ODA allocations. The expected rebound in 
subsequent years is largely based on the positive average trend of 2006-2011.  
The ODA graphs in Annex 3 show each EU Member State's readiness to meet the individual ODA 
target levels of 0.7% and 0.33% of GNI for EU15 and EU12 respectively in 2015, as well as the 
size of the gap and how much is likely to be filled by 2015.  
There are several factors that reduce the likelihood of achieving the 2015 target under the 
status quo:  
First, the reduced ambition of some national plans has had a real impact on collective progress on 
ODA. Some of the more ambitious Member States have reduced their targets compared to the ones 
that formed the basis for the 2005 Council Conclusions. Most of the Member States do not plan for 
reaching their individual targets.  
Second, the current fiscal crunch has led some countries to revise downwards their commitments 
and targets. Spain, after increasing ODA substantially until 2009, has reduced its ODA in 2010 and 
2011 and announced a further reduction of EUR 1.3 billion for 2012. After remaining above 0.80% 
since 2005, the etherlands is reducing its ODA target to 0.70%. Italy has consistently missed 
targets and its aid has been declining for most of the past decade. Net of debt relief, Italy’s ODA is 
projected to remain essentially unchanged in nominal terms (below EUR 2 billion per year) between 
2012 and 2013 at already minimal levels.  
Third, back-loading the increase in ODA expenditure has been one of the main factors in missing 
target levels. Experience shows that missing intermediate targets in a significant way leads to 
missing subsequent targets too. A good example is provided by the Member States that significantly 
missed the 2006 target of 0.33% GNI: Greece, Italy and Portugal. Once the target was missed, 
statements were made that the 2006 target would be achieved by 2007 or 2008. In reality, the 2006 
target has not been met by any of them even by 2010 and these three Member States ended up 
missing both the 2006 and the 2010 targets. 
Fourth, reaching the EU ODA targets is contingent not only on the medium-sized donors, but 
also on EU countries with large economies such as France, Germany, Italy and the UK to boost 
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average aid levels so as to reach targets. These countries account for almost 70% of the gap to be 
filled between 2010 and 2015. If the EU as a whole is to meet the collective target of 0.7% 
ODA/GNI by 2015, it is imperative that all the big players step up their efforts, whereas only the 
United Kingdom has so far committed to do so. 
Table 4.1.4b below shows the funding gap between the 0.7% target and the current level of ODA 
from EU Member States. It is clear that unless decisive action is taken, the 2015 target will be 
missed by a large margin.  
Table 4.1.4b - Gap between 2011 ODA levels and 0.7% and 0.33% ODA/ GI individual targets,  
by Member State 
Projected 
increase in 
ODA by 2015
EUR Million % of GNI EUR Million EUR Million % of gap EUR Million % of GNI
Austria 796            0,27       608                  979                    2,7         2 384           0,70       
Belgium 2 014         0,53       958                  6                       0,0         2 977           0,70       
Bulgaria 35              0,09       26                    88                      0,2         149              0,33       
Cyprus 28              0,16       5                      33                      0,1         65               0,33       
Czech Republic 184            0,13       24                    325                    0,9         533              0,33       
Denmark 2 144         0,86       180                  457                    1,2         2 782           1,00       
Estonia 18              0,12       12                    30                      0,1         60               0,33       
Finland 1 013         0,52       147                  403                    1,1         1 563           0,70       
France 9 345         0,46       1 243               5 069                 13,8       15 657         0,70       
Germany 10 452       0,40       1 855               7 981                 21,7       20 288         0,70       
Greece 238            0,11       58-                    1 368                 3,7         1 548           0,70       
Hungary 101            0,11       1-                      242                    0,7         341              0,33       
Ireland 650            0,52       49                    280                    0,8         978              0,70       
Italy 3 050         0,19       239-                  9 275                 25,2       12 086         0,70       
Latvia 14              0,07       6                      59                      0,2         79               0,33       
Lithuania 38              0,13       25                    56                      0,2         118              0,33       
Luxembourg 297            0,99       31                    -                     -         328              1,00       
Malta 14              0,25       8                      -                     -         22               0,33       
The Netherlands 4 698         0,75       471                  238-                    0,6-         4 930           0,70       
Poland 300            0,08       57                    1 032                 2,8         1 389           0,33       
Portugal 481            0,29       125                  613                    1,7         1 219           0,70       
Romania 118            0,09       43                    377                    1,0         538              0,33       
Slovak Republic 62              0,09       6                      192                    0,5         260              0,33       
Slovenia 45              0,13       19                    65                      0,2         130              0,33       
Spain 3 067         0,29       1 317-               6 386                 17,4       8 136           0,70       
Sweden 4 032         1,02       657                  102-                    0,3-         4 587           1,00       
UK 9 881         0,56       4 778               -                     -         14 659         0,70       
Total EU MS 53 115       0,42       9 719               34 974               95,0       97 808         0,69       
Unassigned gap 
to collective 
target 1 823                 5,0         1 823           0,01       
EU27 53 115       0,42       9 719               36 797               100,0     99 631         0,70       
Total ODA in 2015 to 
meet national targets
Remaining gap to national 
targetsODA 2011
Member State
 
Source: OECD DAC and European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on financing for development) 
 
4.1.5. The Way Forward 
The European Union and its Member States have repeatedly reiterated their commitments to 
achieve the 0.7% ODA to GNI ratio by 2015, as a concrete, time-bound goal. The rationale for a 
time-bound target was to provide adequate funding to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. 
This was not solely an act of solidarity but a strategy to tackle the root causes of poverty and 
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fragility before they spiral out of control, generating refugee flows and security threats. It was also 
designed to face challenges that know no boundaries and that affect the entire planet, such as 
climate change, loss of biodiversity, desertification or the spread of infectious diseases. EU Heads 
of State and Government confirmed that ODA remains an important element of the EU support to 
developing countries, and repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to reaching the individual and 
collective ODA targets by 2015. At the same time, the Council has not agreed any concrete 
measures to ensure the national steps necessary for fulfilling this commitment. 
The Commission has, in the last five annual reports, proposed three ways ways to step up efforts: 
(a) drawing up of realistic and verifiable national ODA action plans outlining how Member States 
aim to scale up and strive to achieve the 2015 ODA targets; (b) introducing a peer review 
mechanism whereby the European Council would assess the progress of each Member State and 
give guidance for further joint EU progress for attaining the agreed ODA targets; and (c) enacting 
national legislation ring-fencing ODA. 
 
4.1.6. Falling short of EU’s promise on ODA to Africa 
Since making the commitment to direct 50% of EU aid increases to Africa in 2005 (based on 2004 
aid levels), the combined EU aid to Africa has risen by about EUR 6.2 billion at constant prices so 
that 28% of total EU ODA growth between 2004 and 2011 went to Africa, as shown in Figure 
4.1.6. 
In Member States' replies on their individual actions, the target of allocating 50% of the ODA 
increase to Africa does not seem to be considered relevant, as no reference is made to this. On the 
other hand, Member States often cite the share of Africa in their overall ODA or geographically 
programmable ODA for measuring/displaying their effort. Most EU Member States are taking 
actions to increase ODA targeted to Africa. For some, aid to Africa already accounts for most of 
their bilateral ODA (e.g. 80% for Ireland, 65% for Portugal). A few Member States will not 
contribute to that target through their bilateral ODA as they believe their comparative advantage is 
in other regions of the world. An important dimension is the imputed multilateral share of EU aid to 
Africa, which amounted to an estimated EUR 11 billion in 2011 and contributed 50% of the 
collective EU increase from 2004 to 2011. Overall 43% or EUR 25.3 billion of EU ODA was 
targeted to Africa in 2011.  
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Figure 4.1.6 - ODA to Africa from EU15 in EUR million and as a % of GI (including imputed multilateral 
flows)  
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How did EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa increase since 2005? 
EU ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa grew by around EUR 5.5 billion in real terms over the period 
2004-2011, thus meeting the less demanding target of increasing EU aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
80% of this growth was due to aid through multilateral channels. Only Austria, Greece, Netherlands 
and Portugal decreased their ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa over this period. Estimates for 2011 
indicate there was no further growth.  
 
4.1.7. Honouring the EU commitment on ODA to Least Developed Countries 
In November 2008, Member States promised, as part of the EU’s overall ODA commitments, to 
provide collectively 0.15% to 0.20% of their GNI to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) by 2010 
while fully meeting the differentiated commitments set out in the ’Brussels Programme of action for 
the LDCs for the decade 2001-2010’. 
Since making the commitment to direct 50% of EU aid increases to Africa in 2005 (based on 2004 
aid levels), the combined EU aid to Africa has risen by about EUR 6.2 billion at constant prices so 
that 28% of total EU ODA growth between 2004 and 2011 went to Africa, as shown in Figure 
4.1.6. 
 
Figure 4.1.7 - EU ODA to LDCs as a % of GI including imputed multilateral flows 
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Source: OECD DAC  
The LDCs' share of EU ODA has increased both in absolute and relative terms since 2004 and 
reached EUR 18.8 billion in 2011, corresponding to 35% of EU ODA or 0.15% of EU GI, 
thus meeting the target. 
Figure 4.1.7 summarises the evolution of ODA to LDCs over GNI ratios for EU Member States 
reporting to DAC over the period 2004-2011. The peak in 2005 and 2006 is due to large debt relief 
operations in those years. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom remained above the ODA to LDC target in 2011. Ireland is the only 
Member State that has kept a share of ODA to LDC greater than or equal to 50% for the entire 
period. Member States that have not reached the target need to make enhanced efforts to increase 
their overall ODA and, within this, to increase the proportion of aid that goes to LDCs, although a 
majority of Member States (14 - including all the EU12 Member States) do not expect to be able to 
reach the 0.15 target any time soon. 
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4.2. Scaling up funding for tackling Climate Change and Biodiversity in the context of 
Sustainable Development  
4.2.1. Climate change fast-start finance  
EU Commitments 
European Council Conclusions on 10/11 December 2009
1
: The EU and its Member States are 
ready to contribute with fast-start funding of EUR 2.4 billion annually for the years 2010 to 2012. 
4.2.1.1. Background 
The EU as a whole is committed to playing a leading role in the fight against global warming and is 
an active participant in the negotiations on climate change under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
The EU and its Member States have pledged to contribute fast-start funding totalling EUR 7.2 
billion for the years 2010 to 2012. Developed countries also committed to a long-term goal of 
jointly providing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries in 
the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency of implementation. This funding will 
come from a variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative 
sources of finance. Through numerous Council Conclusions, the EU and its Member States have 
reaffirmed their commitment to doing their fair share in this context and actively working towards 
identification of a pathway for scaling up available financing together with international partners.  
The Commission has proposed that for the next Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
(2014-2020) “no less than 50% of the programme for Global Public Goods and Challenges will be 
spent on climate change and environmental objectives.” The Commission proposal also foresees an 
overall climate expenditure target of 20% applied to all of the external heading instruments during 
the next multiannual financial perspectives. To validate progress towards this objective the 
provisions in the respective horizontal regulations introduce both ex-ante and ex-post tracking in 
line with the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Rio-markers definitions.  
Better policies are at least as important as more funding. For example, the agreement by the 
G20 to rationalise and phase out fossil fuel subsidies (amounting to EUR 308.8 billion - USD 409 
billion - in emerging and developing countries in 2010) is a step in the direction that the EU has 
adopted for several years. As a matter of fact, a recent OECD study
2
 shows that removing consumer 
subsidies for energy over the next decade would reduce global greenhouse gases emissions by over 
10 % in 2050. 
4.2.1.2. Volume and focus of EU support 
Monitoring ODA which is related to climate change and other environmental issues has long been a 
difficult task due to the complexity of the issues and their multidimensional character. To help carry 
out this task, two markers have been set up within the DAC/CRS system: “climate change-
                                                 
1
 European Council Conclusions on 10/11 December 2009, EUCO 6/09 
2
 For reference and a summary of other relevant studies see for example: OECD (2011), Tackling Climate Change and 
Growing the Economy. Key messages and recommendations from recent OECD work 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/18/44287948.pdf  
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adaptation” and “climate change-mitigation”.
1
 Data prepared using these markers have been 
released for the first time in January 2012, covering ODA disbursed during 2010.  
Different conversion factors are used by the Commission where only 40% of total project costs are 
considered for Rio Marker 1. Several EU Member States apply similar methodologies. EU 
estimates on climate change related ODA are therefore quite conservative. There are no guidelines 
on the application of such conversion factor internationally or at EU level.  
Based on the 2011 and 2012 EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Developments, the EU and 
its Member States committed in their budgets EUR 2.26 billion in 2010 and EUR 2.33 billion 
in 2011 respectively. Accordingly the EU, having collected EUR 4.59 billion in 2010-2011, 
remains on track to achieve the goal of EUR 7.2 billion over the period 2010-2012, despite 
difficult economic situation and budgetary constraints. These are preliminary figures as the 
accounting year for many Member States has not been concluded yet. Non fast start finance for 
climate change increased from EUR 2.8 billion in 2010 (as recorded in the DAC CRS) to an 
estimated EUR 3.5 billion in 2011, based on the answers given by Member States to the 2012 
questionnaire. It must be emphasised that, as shown in Table 4.2.1.2 below, data on the overall 
climate finance envelope is not available for all Member States.  
Table 4.2.1.2 below analyses ODA provided in 2010 for climate change adaptation and mitigation 
by all donors and combines two sources: (a) new CRS data that allow us to determine how much 
ODA was given for adaptation and mitigation (last year’s report included an estimate); and (b) data 
from last year’s questionnaire to determine the share of fast start climate finance. Unfortunately, 
detailed ODA data are released over a year after the close of the financial year they refer to, and 
2011 data will only be available by January 2013, too late to be included in this report. 
The EU has been by far the largest contributor to both mitigation-related and adaptation-
related ODA in 2010 with a share above 70%, demonstrating strong commitment to fight 
climate change at a time of significant budget cuts in many Member States. Non fast start and 
fast start finance were broadly equivalent, unlike last year’s estimations which anticipated that the 
latter would be almost twice the former. The high EU share could be due to uneven reporting by 
other DAC Member States on the new climate change markers, but it is nevertheless a good 
indication of the efforts made by the EU. 
                                                 
1
 An activity should be classified as adaptation related (with a score of principal – 2, significant – 1, or 0 – not targeted, 
in declining order of importance) if it intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the impacts of 
climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity and resilience. An activity 
should be classified as mitigation (with the same scoring grid) if it contributes to the objective of stabilisation of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system by promoting efforts to reduce or limit GHG emissions or to enhance GHG 
sequestration. Some development cooperation activities could do both, and there are therefore overlaps. 
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Table 4.2.1.2 - ODA estimate for Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in 2010 
(Net disbursements, EUR million at current prices)
1
 
 
Type All % of total EU Non EU EU Share 
Adaptation 1,664.71 23% 979.63 685.09 59% 
Principal 532.69 7% 161.59 371.10 30% 
Significant 1,132.02 16% 818.04 313.98 72% 
Mitigation 3,831.62 53% 2,842.12 989.50 74% 
Principal 2,679.69 37% 1,867.12 812.56 70% 
Significant 1,151.93 16% 975.00 176.94 85% 
Adaptation and Mitigation 1,761.15 24% 1,341.53 419.61 76% 
Both Principal 1,126.05 16% 741.64 384.42 66% 
Both Significant 635.09 9% 599.90 35.20 94% 
Total Climate Change 7,257.48 100% 5,163.28 2,094.20 71% 
of which:  
Fast-start finance (as reported in May 2011) 2,340.00 
Non Fast-start finance (actual) 2,823.28 
Non Fast-start finance (est. in 2011) 3,959.92 
Climate change ODA 2010/Average 2007-2009 
  
1.30 
  
Sources: DAC CRS for all data except Fast Start Finance which is from the 2011  
 
4.2.1.3. Measuring additionality 
In 2009, the Council agreed that climate financing required additional resources, and that ODA 
should continue to play a role in supporting adaptation (including disaster risk reduction) in the 
most vulnerable and least developed countries.
2
 
A methodology to determine additionality was proposed in last year’s report. The average EU total 
ODA for the period 2007 to 2009, net of climate change related activities, was set as benchmark 
                                                 
1
 The table avoids double counting using the following method. Principal (2) always prevails over substantial (1). If 
mitigation is set as principal and adaptation substantial for the same activity, the higher mark prevails and the activity is 
classified as mitigation. When the ratings are equal, the ODA is classified under “Adaptation and Mitigation”. The 
combinations are as follows. Mitigation or Adaptation: Principal (2-0 and 2-1); Substantial (1-0). Mitigation and 
Adaptation: Principal (2-2); Substantial (1-1). 
2
 Council Conclusions on Climate Change and Development, 16071/09, 17 November 2009  
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and estimated at EUR 46.5 billion in constant 2010 prices.
1
 By this reasoning, if climate finance is 
to be additional, the EU’s total ODA excluding climate-related ODA, should be higher than this 
benchmark level in the years 2010-12. 
The above criterion for additionality was met in 2010, using this report’s data for the EU’s 
total ODA in 2010 – namely EUR 53.5 billion in constant 2010 prices. This is EUR 0.7 billion 
above the benchmark level, which corresponds to the maximum potential volume of climate finance 
that would be additional without cutting into support to other sectors. This is enough to cover the 
EUR 2.3 billion dedicated to fast-start finance and EUR 2.8 billion of non-fast-start finance for 
2010 determined using the latest CRS data. 
As shown in Figure 4.2.1.3, the preliminary figures available for 2011 seem to indicate that the 
above criterion for additionality was met also in 2011, although with a further contraction of the 
margin above the 2007-2009 benchmark. 
Figure 4.2.1.3: Calculating the additionality of climate finance in 2011 – EUR million in 2010 prices  
Average 2007-2009 2010
Fast Start - 2,395 
Non Fast Start 3,960 3,474 
Other ODA 46,486 47,097 
30,000 
35,000 
40,000 
45,000 
50,000 
55,000 
Benchmark
EUR 46.49 billion
Total ODA 2011
EUR 53.0 billion
ODA Increase net of 
climate change  
EUR 0.7  billion
ODA 2011 
net of climate change
EUR 47.1 billion
Additional ODA for 
climate change  
EUR 5.9  billion
 
Source: OECD DAC for ODA and mitigation data 2007-2009 for DAC reporting Member States as well as climate 
change adaptation and mitigation for 2010. EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development for fast-start 
finance. 
 
                                                 
1
 See last year’s report for a description of the methodology. We have updated the volumes using the latest DAC 
deflators to convert ODA at 2008 prices into ODA at 2010 prices. 
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4.2.2. Biodiversity  
EU Commitments  
● European Council Conclusions on the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): outcome of 
and follow-up to the 3agoya biodiversity conference, 20 December 2010.
1
 The EU and its Member 
States have committed to implementing the strategy for resource mobilisation and to substantially 
increasing resources (financial, human and technical) from all possible sources balanced with the 
effective implementation of the CBD and its strategic plan. The EU will actively involve in 
developing baselines for monitoring the implementation of the strategy, and in implementing the 
COP 10 decision to adopt targets at CBD COP 11, provided that robust baselines have been 
identified and endorsed and that an effective reporting framework has been adopted. 
● June 2011 Council Conclusions on the EU Biodiversity Strategy
2
 and succeeding December 2011 
Conclusions on implementation of the Europe 2020 Biodiversity Strategy.
3
 
4.2.2.1. Background  
A global strategy to combat biodiversity loss for the coming decade was adopted at the tenth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 10) of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) in Nagoya (Japan) in October 2010.
4
 The plan is backed up by a strategy for mobilising 
resource to help achieve the CBD’s three objectives.  
The Council adopted Conclusions on the implementation of the Europe 2020 Biodiversity 
Strategy at its meeting on 19 December 2011.
5
 The new strategy has six main targets with 20 
actions to help the EU address biodiversity challenges. Internationally, the EU contribution to 
averting global biodiversity loss is to be stepped up, through a reduction of indirect drivers of 
biodiversity loss (e.g. changing consumption patterns, reducing harmful subsidies, and including 
biodiversity issues in trade negotiations) and mobilisation of additional resources for global 
biodiversity conservation. Specifically, the EU and its Member States committed to “contributing 
their fair share to international efforts to significantly increase resources for global biodiversity as 
part of the international process aimed at estimating biodiversity funding needs and adopting 
resource mobilisation targets for biodiversity at CBD CoP11” to be held in Hyderabad, India on 
October 8-19, 2012. The Council Conclusions of 11 June 2012 on the preparation of CBD COP 11 
emphasise the need to continue to play a proactive role to fulfil those commitments and keep the 
momentum from Nagoya. They also recognise the need to further improve the effectiveness of 
existing funding and mobilise new types of funding sources, including the private sector and other 
stakeholders, e.g. through mainstreaming and integration of biodiversity considerations at all levels. 
The importance of IFM as an essential and necessary funding source, in addition to traditional 
financing mechanisms, and as a tool for mainstreaming biodiversity is also emphasised.  
                                                 
1
 http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_10510_fr.htm  
2
 Council Conclusions on the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, 11978/11, 23 June 2011, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st11/st11978.en11.pdf  
3
 Council Conclusions on the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 – Towards implementation, 18862/11, 19 December 
2011, http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1379139/st18862.en11.pdf  
4
 The Convention on Biological Diversity entered into force in 1993 and has three main objectives: i) the conservation 
of biological diversity; ii) the sustainable use of the components of biological diversity; and iii) the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. The Convention obliges developed countries to 
provide new and additional financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention (Article 20).  
5
 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/comm2006/2020.htm for details. 
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The EU recognises that the link between ecosystems, on the one hand, and employment, income 
and livelihoods, on the other hand, is even stronger in developing countries than in developed 
countries.
1
 In that connection, the Commission’s 2010 Work Programme on Policy Coherence for 
Development and the PCD report of 2010 have specific sections on biodiversity. This ambition is 
carried forward in the new EU Development Policy framework as set forth in the ‘Agenda for 
Change’, which states that “EU development policy should promote a ‘green economy’ that can 
generate growth, create jobs and help reduce poverty by valuing and investing in natural capital.”
2
 
4.2.2.2. Volume and focus of EU support 
Similar to climate finance, support to biodiversity is measured through a specific marker in the 
CRS, and may suffer irregularities from uneven reporting by DAC members. Based on this data, the 
volume of EU ODA relating to biodiversity increased by over 140% during the period 2006-
2010 in real terms, from EUR 1.3 billion in 2006 to EUR 3 billion in 2010 (see Figure 4.2.2.2), 
although only 26% had biodiversity as a principal objective. During this period, the EU committed, 
on average, EUR 1.7 billion per year for biodiversity-related aid, representing 53% of total ODA for 
biodiversity from all bilateral donors and multilateral organisations reporting to DAC CRS.  
 
Figure 4.2.2.2a: EU's biodiversity-related ODA by objective. 2007-2010 
(Commitments, EUR million at constant 2010 prices) 
 
Source: OECD DAC/CRS
3
 
Among EU Member States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain were the largest 
donors in 2010, but several other countries also donated substantial amounts during this period (see 
Table 4.2.2.2 below).  
The EU’s biodiversity-related aid as a share of total EU ODA increased from 2.1% in 2006 to 5.6% 
in 2010, in line with the increasing focus on sustainable development. Most Member States see 
biodiversity and its associated ecosystem services both as a crosscutting and a sectoral issue in their 
development cooperation, and thus mainstream it in their development programmes, though more 
efforts are needed to ensure that biodiversity is included in the priorities of partner countries.  
                                                 
1
 Council conclusions on Biodiversity: Post-2010 EU and global vision and targets and international ABS regime, 
7536/10, 15 March 2010 
2
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF  
3
 Luxembourg does not report on the Rio markers. No data for the Netherlands for 2009 
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Table 4.2.2.2: EU’s biodiversity-related bilateral aid, 2006-2010
1
 adjusted deflators 
(Commitments, EUR million at constant 2010 prices) 
Member State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 
2006-
2010 
Austria 13 11 24 22 12 16 
Belgium 29 52 92 95 135 81 
Denmark 122 81 128 87 191 122 
EU Institutions 378 226 254 526 502
2
 377 
Finland 3 38 98 84 90 63 
France 111 126 166 171 649 244 
Germany 231 182 205 223 441 256 
Greece 2 3 3 6 3 4 
Ireland - 20 13 70 31 27 
Italy 10 88 59 46 4 42 
Luxembourg - - - - 3 1 
Netherlands 236 170 183 - 75 133 
Portugal 1 2 2 3 3 2 
Slovenia  1 1 1 1 1 
Spain 67 73 255 209 229 166 
Sweden 24 0 11 5 150 38 
United Kingdom 9 6 10 11 451 97 
Total 1,234 1,079 1,503 1,558 2,969 1,670 
Source: OECD DAC/CRS
3
. EU annual questionnaire on Financing for Development for Slovenia. Hungary and 
Romania reported amounts below Euro 0.5 million and are therefore not included. 
 
Over a third of the EU’s biodiversity-related aid goes to Africa and around one fifth to Asia and one 
seventh to America (see Figure 4.2.2.2.b). The support is divided among 145 countries and 
territories. One fourth of the support has no specific geographical focus. 
 
                                                 
1
 The breakdown between principal and significant objective is not available for 2006. Data for years 1998-2006 were 
obtained by DAC on a trial basis; reporting became mandatory starting with 2007 flows. 
2
 The 2010 data for EU Institutions is currently being updated in the OECD DAC statistics. 
3
 Luxembourg did not report on the Rio markers up to 2009 and there is no data for the Netherlands for 2009. OECD 
DAC Full List of biodiversity aid activities (2007-2009) (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/46809641.xls), OECD 
DAC Full List of biodiversity aid activities (2010) (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/25/49450525.zip), and OECD 
DAC Aid targeting the objectives of the Rio Conventions 1998-2007 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/60/48895957.pdf ). 
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Figure 4.2.2.2b - EU’s biodiversity-related bilateral aid by geographic area, 2007-2010, percentage 
share, commitments 
 
Source: OECD DAC/CRS 
In terms of sectors, the EU’s biodiversity-related aid falls primarily within environmental 
protection, followed by water supply and sanitation, agriculture and forestry (see Figure 4.2.2.2.c). 
 
Figure 4.2.2.2c: EU’s biodiversity-related bilateral aid by sector, 2007-2010, percentage share, 
commitments 
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1
 Luxembourg does not report on the Rio markers and there are no data for the Netherlands for 2009. Activities marked 
with a ‘principal’ or a ‘significant’ objective are included. 
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4.2.3. Sustainable Development 
The ‘Agenda for Change’ aims at putting a greater focus on investing in drivers for inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth. It envisages a greater focus on helping reduce developing countries' 
exposure to global shocks, such as climate change, ecosystem and resource degradation, and 
volatile and escalating energy and agricultural prices, by concentrating investment in sustainable 
agriculture and energy. It foresees support to the decent work agenda, social protection schemes and 
floors, providing the workforce with the right skills and encouraging policies to facilitate regional 
labour mobility. 
The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), held in Rio de Janeiro on 
20-22 June 2012 provided a unique opportunity for all involved to renew strong political 
commitment to sustainable development at all levels, to assess the progress made to date, identify 
remaining implementation gaps and address new and emerging challenges.  
In the EU Common position for Rio+20
1
, two priorities were highlighted. First, the need for a 
green economy roadmap with specific goals, objectives and actions at international level; second, 
the need for a package of reforms in the Institutional framework for sustainable development, which 
should lead to a strengthened international environmental governance (IEG). 
During preparations, the Council of the European Union highlighted in March 2012
2
 that funding 
for the implementation of sustainable development will have to come from both public and 
private sources, and called for a more effective use of existing resources and the identification of 
innovative sources. It underscored that mobilisation of funding must be undertaken in a way that is 
consistent with the objectives of global economic recovery, and underlined the important role of 
International Financial Institutions and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). In that connection, 
the EU submission to UN DESA in November 2011, stated that “a joint approach by traditional 
donors, emerging economies, international financial institutions (IFIs) and the private sector is 
needed, addressing the 'silo' approach to channelling funds and ensuring a more effective 
identification and use of existing resources, as well as mobilisation of available and innovative 
sources of finance.”  
The EU is also constructively engaging in the discussion about launching a process on Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) to be coordinated by the UN Secretary General. The establishment of 
SDGs, fully encompassing all three dimensions of sustainable development, will provide the 
opportunity to focus efforts at the global, regional and national level and could be an important 
driver for mainstreaming sustainable development and integration of its three dimensions in a 
balanced and synergistic way. The work on SDGs should be coordinated and coherent with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) review process, without deviating efforts from the 
achievement of the MDGs by 2015. Furthermore, the EU considers that it would be important to 
have an overarching framework for post 2015 that encompasses the three dimensions of sustainable 
development with goals that address key challenges in a holistic and coherent way to ensure the 
optimal mix of measures for attaining lasting solutions.  
 
                                                 
1
 Council Conclusions on Rio+20: Towards achieving sustainable development by greening the economy and 
improving governance, 15388/11, 11 October 2011, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st15/st15388.en11.pdf  
2
 European Council Conclusions on 9 March_2012, Rio+20 Pathways to a Sustainable Future 
 EN 70 
4.3. Seeking synergies in EU support  
In the context of ongoing various international processes, discussions on ODA, all aspects of 
sustainable development and global public goods in general are closely linked. For example, 
building a dam provides various services in a developing country: job creation, resilience to 
droughts (climate adaptation), sustainable energy (green growth and climate mitigation), and may at 
the same time have negative social and environmental impacts (need for moving people and 
changed river flows) that needs to be mitigated – all these services and impacts are aspects of 
sustainable development in the widest sense. This calls for an integrated approch that truly 
integrates all three dimensions of sustaianble development in a balanced and synergistic way, and 
for seeking coherence across different policy areas.  
There seems to be an emerging international consensus that better measures of progress and 
development efficiency are needed to tackle global challenges. The proposals for defining new 
aggregates that would enhance accountability fall into three broad categories: (a) changing how we 
measure ODA efforts (notably by revising the ODA concept)
1
; (b) changing what we measure 
(including by complementing/replacing ODA with a broader aggregate like “total net resource 
flows for development”
2
); or (c) changing where we measure ODA/GNI ratios (at the recipient level 
rather than at the donor’s level).
3
  
                                                 
1
 See for example, Brzoska, Michaela (2010). Analysis of and recommendations for covering security relevant 
expenditures within and outside of official development assistance, Paper 53, Bonn International Center for 
Conversion 
2
 See for example, OECD DAC (2011), Identifying 3ew Measures for 3on-ODA Development Contributions, 
DCD/DAC(2011)43; or Severino, Jean-Michel and Ray, Olivier (2009). The End of ODA: Death and Rebirth 
of a Global Public Policy. CGD - Center for Global Development - Working Paper Number 167. 
3
 See for example, ODI (2012), From high to low aid: a proposal to classify countries by aid receipt, Background Note, 
March 2012. 
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5. MAKIG EU ACTIOS MORE EFFECTIVE FOR DEVELOPMET 
5.1. Making EU aid more effective 
EU Commitments 
● On 17 3ovember 2009
1
, the Council (General Affairs and External Relations) adopted 
the Conclusions on an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, with additions made 
in June 2010 (cross country division of labour DoL) and December 2010 (accountability 
and transparency).
2
 
● The Operational Framework includes detailed commitments on accelerating Division of 
Labour (DoL); increased use of country systems; ensuring technical cooperation for 
enhanced capacity development; and strengthening accountability and transparency. 
The EU and its Member States are working on a range of measures to implement 
commitments in relation to the Paris Declaration principles, the Accra Agenda for Action, 
and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Since the Rome 
Declaration on aid harmonisation of 2003, the EU has embedded the evolving international aid 
effectiveness consensus in various Council Conclusions and has reviewed the related efforts of EU 
Member States in all previous editions of the present report. 
In November 2009, the General Affairs and External Relations Council adopted an Operational 
Framework on Aid Effectiveness containing measures in key areas of the aid effectiveness agenda, 
such as division of labour, use of country systems and technical cooperation for enhanced capacity 
development. Based on Commission proposals, the Operational Framework was complemented in 
2010 by a subchapter on cross-country division of labour
3
 and a new chapter on a common EU 
approach for implementing commitments on mutual accountability and transparency.
4
 
The Council Conclusions on the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness
5
 emphasised the need for an inclusive Post-Busan Agenda, building bridges towards 
different development actors, notably emerging economies, civil society organisations and the 
private sector as well as for domestic accountability mechanisms in partner countries. 
The Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012
6
 on “Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: 
an Agenda for Change” emphasise the importance of improved mutual accountability, sector 
concentration, targeting of resources, joint multiannual programming, cross-country division of 
labour, ownership, sustainable growth and transparency. In particular, they stress that “the EU 
should develop a common framework for measuring and communicating the results of development 
policy, including for inclusive and sustainable growth. In line with the Operational Framework on 
Aid Effectiveness, the EU will work with partner countries and other donors on comprehensive 
approaches to domestic and mutual accountability and transparency, including through the building 
of statistical capacity.” 
                                                 
1
 Council Conclusions on An Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness, 15912/09, 18 November 2009 
2
 Council Conclusions on an Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness – Consolidated text, 18239/10, 11 January 
2011. 
3
 Council Conclusions on Cross-country division of labour, 10348/10, 14 June 2010. 
4
 Council Conclusions on Mutual accountability and transparency, 17769/10, 10 December 2010. 
5
 Council Conclusions on the EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 16773/11, 
14 November 2011. 
6
 Council Conclusion on Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, 9369/12, 14 May 
2012 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st09/st09369.en12.pdf  
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Article 210 of the Lisbon Treaty states that the Union and its Member States shall coordinate 
their policies on development cooperation, and consult each other on their aid programmes, 
including in international organisations and during international conferences, and may undertake 
joint action, and contribute if necessary to the implementation of Union aid programmes. 
This new legal and policy framework provides a new opportunity to make EU development aid 
more effective, efficient, and successful in terms of actual impact on the ground. It should also 
make a real difference in terms of EU political impact and visibility. Studies carried out on behalf of 
the European Commission
1
 found that fully implementing the Aid Effectiveness Agenda
2
 would 
allow efficiency savings and gains of EUR 5 billion per year, and gains from redistribution effects 
through coordinated country allocation of an additional EUR 7.8 billion per year. 
 
5.1.1. EU and Member States performance in implementing the Paris Declaration (2005-2010) 
The 2011 OECD/ DAC Paris Declaration Survey, the results of which were published in September 
2011, together with the replies of the Member States to this year’s questionnaire provide good 
evidence for a thorough review of EU aid effectiveness performance.  
As noted by the OECD DAC Secretariat in its analysis of the 2011 Paris Declaration Survey’s 
findings, these were “sobering” for all donors, including the EU and its Member States. Reference 
is made here to the EU collective performance, as individual Member States performed better than 
others.  
The main conclusion is that the EU missed its 2010 ODA quantitative targets, as described 
above in this report, as well as most of its qualitative targets as enshrined in the Paris 
Declaration. As a whole, the EU in fact met only one of the twelve indicators relating to donor 
performance (i.e. coordinated technical cooperation).  
However, OECD DAC also concluded that “considerable progress has been made towards 
many of the remaining targets.” Most of the overall progress among bilateral donors 
worldwide was made possible thanks to progress by EU Member States. Most EU Member 
States performed above the “all donors” average, showing a significant commitment to the 
achievement of the goals of the Paris Declaration under difficult global conditions.  
Out of twelve indicators and sub-indicators referring to the performance of donors, the EU and its 
Member States met one and improved eleven over the period 2005-2010. In contrast, non-EU 
bilateral donors met no target, and improved only three indicators, all closing at a much lower level 
and further from their target than the EU and its Member States. 
The EU was also the group that made most progress on the use of country procurement systems, 
predictability and the reduction in the number of parallel Project Implementation Units (PIU’s).  
 
5.1.2. EU and Member States action on alignment 
Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and procedures and helping to 
strengthen their capacities is a central principle of the Paris Declaration. To improve alignment 
                                                 
1
 HTSPE, Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach, October 2009. 
2
 SOGES, The Aid Effectiveness Agenda: The benefits of going ahead, 2010. 
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donors agreed to use country systems (i.e. national arrangements and procedures for public 
financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring) to 
the maximum extent possible. Using a partner country’s own institutions and systems has a positive 
impact on aid effectiveness: it creates a special incentive to strengthening the partner country’s 
institutional capacities in programme implementation, accounting, monitoring and evaluation and in 
reporting to Parliament and to its citizens. EU donors also committed to aligning their conditions, 
whenever possible, with their partner’s national development strategy, and to make them public. In 
addition, EU donors have committed to disbursing aid in a timely and predictable fashion 
according to agreed schedules. In terms of technical cooperation, EU donors have significantly 
reduced the number of parallel project implementation units, in order to build on the capacities of 
partner countries. 
Use of Country Systems (UCS)  
The use of country systems by the EU and its Member States has improved substantially since 
2005, particularly as far as procurement systems are concerned, but still fall short of targets. On 
using country systems as a first option
1
, Member States have scaled up their efforts compared to 
last year. 
– 13 Member States revised the design of aid instruments irrespective of modality (up from 
11 in 2010);  
– staff training was provided by 17 Member States (up from 11 in 2010), 
– 19 Member States supported partner country capacity development for improving the 
quality of country systems (up from 17 in 2010).  
– 14 out of 25 Member States supported the use of country systems through an assessment to 
identify internal constraints, slightly down from the 15 reported one year ago. 
The 2011 Communication on The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to third countries
2
 states 
that “budget support, in particular ‘Good Governance and Development Contracts’, should be used 
to strengthen core government systems, such as public finance management and public 
administration.” The ensuing Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012
3
 emphasise the commitment to 
use budget support effectively to support (…) the use of country systems.  
Making aid more predictable  
Table 5.1.2 below presents the ratios between actual 2009 and 2010 ODA flows and budgets 
prepared one, two or three years before (the latter is available only for 2010). Ratios below 100% 
mean that actual expenditure was below budget, while ratios above 100% indicate that actual 
expenditure was above budget. Overall, most EU Member States achieved a good degree of 
predictability with ratios above the DAC average for one-year, two-year, and three-year 
predictability.  
 
Table 5.1.2 – Predictability Ratios of DAC Members’ Country Programmable Aid 
(2009-2010, percentages) 
                                                 
1
 See European Council, 11 January 2011, Doc. 18239/10. Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness – Consolidated 
text: paragraphs 6, 8, 12 and 13 (A. Use of country systems as a first option),  
2
 COM (2011) 638 final. 
3
 Council Conclusions on The Future Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries, 9323/12, 14 May 2012, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st09/st09371.en12.pdf  
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Predictability Ratios 
One-year 
Predictability 
ratio 
Two-year 
predictability 
ratio 
Three-year 
predictability 
ratio 
2009 2010 2009 2010 2010 
DAC Members 
2009 Outturn/ 
programmed 
early 2009 (%) 
2010 Outturn/ 
programmed 
early 2010 (%) 
2009 Outturn/ 
programmed 
early 2008 (%) 
2010 Outturn/ 
programmed 
early 2009 (%) 
2010 Outturn/ 
programmed 
early 2008 (%) 
Australia 111 89 134 102 118 
Austria 100 82 n/a n/a n/a 
Belgium 119 95 56 129 67 
Canada 67 79 97 70 102 
Denmark 91 122 101 97 110 
EU Institutions 117 94 100 114 97 
Finland 103 104 98 102 98 
France 107 122 68 146 97 
Germany 120 90 140 152 86 
Greece n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ireland 88 90 48 76 39 
Italy 60 79 63 36 34 
Japan n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Korea 89 113 n/a 126 n/a 
Luxembourg 104 109 97 n/a 92 
Netherlands 85 89 87 80 83 
New Zealand 73 85 86 66 82 
Norway 71 110 82 90 83 
Portugal 97 200 91 159 232 
Spain 82 81 121 45 77 
Sweden 101 101 113 85 94 
Switzerland 99 92 n/a n/a n/a 
United Kingdom 99 111 86 98 95 
United States n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
DAC countries total 93 100 94 88 90 
Source: OECD DAC forward spending plans (2010 and 2011) 
 
The table shows a satisfactory performance on predictability, with one-year predictability ratios 
increasing for eight and declining for five Member States, and two-year predictability ratios 
increasing for nine and declining for four Member States. The European Commission improved its 
two-year predictability, but worsened its one-year predictability. Only Ireland, Italy, Netherlands 
and Spain have one-year, two-year, and three year predictability ratios all below DAC average, and 
only Spain has reduced both its one-year and two-year predictability ratios between 2009 and 2010. 
Fifteen EU Member States can make multi-annual commitments for projects, twelve for general 
programme based support, and eleven for budget support. For several, outer year budgets are 
indicative and subject to change (e.g., Ireland). 
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5.1.3. EU and Member States action on complementarity and division of labour effectiveness 
The EU and its Member States have strongly promoted the move towards improved 
complementarity and division of labour in partner countries (in-country division of labour) and 
across partner countries (cross-country division of labour). Over the recent years, not only did the 
EU and its Member States adopt a set of key policy documents on implementing the division of 
labour agenda in the EU context, they also successfully contributed to an international consensus on 
division of labour, as agreed in the outcome documents of the Aid Effectiveness fora in Paris, Accra 
and Busan. 
In-country division of labour  
With the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour, EU donors have 
committed to establishing a more effective in-country division of labour. Since 2008, the EU Fast 
Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity (FTI DoL), which involves the 
European Union and Member States as facilitators, has supported DoL processes in approximately 
30 partner countries. The network of EU DoL is being continuously updated and is regularly used 
for communication between EU donors. Most partner countries included in the joint programming 
exercises described below are also part of the FTI DoL. In general, the regular monitoring of the 
FTI revealed that the implementation of in-country division of labour principles by the EU and its 
Member States is progressing. 
However, progress in sector concentration has been very limited. Member States entered 71 and 
exited 90 sectors. Most exits were from social sectors (about two thirds of the total), mostly in Sub-
Saharan Africa (34), followed by South and Central America (25) and Middle East and North 
Africa (15). Most entries concerned the first two regions: Sub-Saharan Africa (28) and South and 
Central America (22).  
Improving multi-donor analysis and response  
As shown in Table 5.1.3, Member States reported 226 cases of multi-donor analyses in 66 partner 
countries, of which roughly one third (75) resulted in a multi-donor response. Almost half of the 
multi-donor analyses concerned Sub-Saharan African countries but only a fourth resulted in multi-
donor responses, compared to two thirds in the Middle East and North Africa and three fourths in 
South America. 
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Table 5.1.3 – umber of EU Multi-donor Analyses in 2010-2011 by Region 
Region Multi-donor Analyses 
% resulting in 
multi-donor 
responses 
Sub-Saharan Africa 107 25% 
East Asia 27 41% 
Central America & the Caribbean 23 39% 
Middle East and North Africa 21 67% 
Europe 19 11% 
South America 12 75% 
South Asia 11 18% 
Central Asia 11 9% 
Total 231 32% 
Source: European Commission (EU annual questionnaire on financing for development 2012) 
Joint Programming  
The EU has taken concrete steps towards making joint programming a reality. Following the 
Development Council of 14 November 2011, adopting the policy on joint programming through the 
Council Conclusions for the Busan Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the EU identified 11 country 
candidates for joint programming in 2012. Ensuing reports from EU Heads of Missions in these 
countries confirmed that joint programming in 6 of them is feasible for commencement in 2012. 
Others may follow in subsequent years. 
In order to strengthen partner countries' ownership and to better align with their strategies and 
priorities as well as to facilitate joint programming, the EU is substantially changing its way of 
programming. As highlighted in the ‘Agenda for Change’, EU programming will be synchronised 
with strategy cycles of partner countries and will no longer cover the same period for all partner 
countries. Member States, too, are adapting their way of programming for the same reasons. 
Cross-country division of labour  
Increasing the geographical focus can substantially contribute to more aid and development 
effectiveness by reducing administrative costs of ODA delivery. In recent years, EU Member States 
have reorganised their bilateral aid portfolios by geographically focusing their assistance, even in 
the presence of increasing aid budgets. In 2010 and 2011, there were 71 cases of exits by EU 
Member States from 43 partner countries, 50 already completed and 21 to be completed between 
2012 and 2016.  
 
5.1.4. EU and Member States actions on mutual accountability and managing for results 
Mutual accountability lies at the heart of the Paris Declaration, and is a process by which two or 
more partners agree to be held responsible for the commitments that they have voluntarily made to 
each other. It helps build trust and partnership around shared agendas and provides incentives for 
behaviour change needed to achieve better results. A central aspect is making aid flows more 
transparent. As stated in the Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness
1
, “in the Accra Agenda 
for Action, donors and partner countries agreed to provide timely and detailed information on 
                                                 
1
 Consolidated version: IV Accountability and transparency, paragraph 1 
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current and future aid flows in order to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit by 
developing countries”. 
The new EU development policy as set forth in the ‘Agenda for Change’ calls for “comprehensive 
approaches to domestic and mutual accountability and transparency.” At this stage, 16 Member 
States already participate in mutual accountability arrangements in more than 10% of their priority 
countries, eight of which do so in 50% or more of their priority countries.  
Performance Assessment.  
Performance assessments use mostly policy dialogue (16 Member States use them), but consultative 
groups (12) and joint review panels (10) are also present. Fourteen Member States participate in 
Performance Assessment Frameworks, but only a few Member States have currently a formal result 
framework in place. Eleven Member States are active in the post-Busan activities of the Building 
Bloc on Results and Accountability. Fourteen Member States support partner countries’ statistical 
capacities for monitoring progress and evaluating impact. Fifteen Member States participate in 
country-level results framework and platforms in more than 10% of their priority countries, and 7 in 
50% or more of their priority countries. The Commission has recently proposed a common result 
reporting framework that could accelerate adoption of a harmonised way to monitor performance at 
the country level.  
Making aid more transparent.  
Most EU non-DAC donors report their ODA to the OECD/DAC. The Commission encourages all 
of them to do so, in line with the OECD/DAC reporting rules, although none of the EU-12 is yet a 
DAC member. Bulgaria is the only Member State that has yet to start reporting systematically to 
DAC. The Commission will continue to work with the DAC secretariat to provide support to the 
EU’s non-DAC donors to enhance their statistical reporting capacity. The EU15 countries have all 
adhered to the new DAC CRS++ reporting formats. 
The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was launched in 2008 to develop consistent 
and coherent international standards so that donors report more timely information on past and 
future aid spending. The European Commission and eight Member States (i.e. Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) are signatories to IATI, 
and are implementing or are preparing to implement its standards. Belgium has decided to join 
IATI, while the Czech Republic is designing a new ODA internal reporting system in full 
compliance with IATI standards, and Estonia is exploring the possibility of making its ODA 
statistics compatible with IATI standards.  
Nineteen Member States have developed and use national aid transparency tools, usually through 
their development cooperation’s websites, and annual reports. Denmark is preparing a new law on 
International Development Assistance that will require increased transparency both at partner 
country level, and domestically. The EU adopted the EU Transparency Guarantee in November 
2011, while both Sweden and the United Kingdom launched national Aid Transparency Guarantees 
in 2010 (see Box 5.1.4.a).  
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Box 5.1.4a – Aid Transparency Guarantees 
• In November 2011, EU Foreign Affairs Ministers agreed on the EU Transparency Guarantee, ensuring that EU 
Member states will publicly disclose all information on aid programmes so that it can be more easily accessed, 
shared and published. It will also make information available on all aid to partner countries, to enable them to 
report them in their national budget documents and help increase transparency towards parliaments, civil society 
and citizens. 
• In 2010 Sweden introduced a transparency guarantee into its development cooperation. The guarantee means that 
all public documents and public information will be made available online. The information shall explain when, to 
whom and why money has been made available, and what results have been achieved. Sweden’s flagship website - 
www.openaid.se - was launched in 2011. Openaid.se is a democratic initiative, facilitating accountability towards 
Swedish tax payers as well as towards people in Sweden’s partner countries, by opening up development 
cooperation to the public. It is a data-hub providing Swedish aid information on disbursements in an open format. 
This means that the format allows for citizens, CSOs and entrepreneurs to use, refine, and develop the data 
provided. The aid information is provided on a global scale, at country level, per sector or by implementing agency. 
It covers a time period of four decades. The Swedish Government is committed to continuing its implementation of 
the transparency guarantee and supports initiatives such as the Open Government Partnership, the Open Aid 
Partnership, and the EU Transparency Guarantee (see below). 
• The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee was launched in June 2010. It commits the United Kingdom to publishing 
detailed information about new DFID projects and policies in a way that is comprehensive, accessible, comparable, 
accurate and timely. Information will be published in English and with summary information in major local 
languages, in a way that is accessible to citizens in the countries in which DFID works. The United Kingdom will 
allow anyone to reuse its information, including for the creation of new applications which make it easier to see 
where aid is being spent. The United Kingdom will finally provide opportunities for those directly affected by its 
projects to provide feedback on their performance. 
The European Commission has developed an information gathering tool called Transparent Aid 
(TR-AID) to support sharing of aid information across major international donors with the aim of 
using aid funds most effectively. Sharing of aid data with the public and amongst donors has always 
been a challenge, due to a large number of data formats in use, and because data is available in 
different repositories. (see Box 5.1.4.b).  
 
Box 5.1.4b – TR-Aid 
• TR-AID incorporates data from multiple sources in varied formats, and allows the publication of comprehensive 
information about both development and humanitarian aid. These include data from the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development), UN OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human 
Affairs), and some EU Member States (Greece, Spain and Belgium for example). TR-AID imports data in different 
formats such as comma separated values, excel, xml etc. TR-AID implements the first phase of IATI thus making it 
compliant with the standard proposed, and potentially opening TR-AID up to incorporate any data published via 
the IATI registry.  
• TR-AID is not yet available for the public, a step foreseen for late 2012. 
• The TR-AID user interface is currently available in English, French, Spanish, Italian and German, with plans to 
make it available in the 23 official languages of the EU by early 2013. The users can search the database for 
information relating to projects such as sectors, aid type, flow type, markers, status, countries, regions, etc. They 
can also search for organisation details such as those relating to recipients, implementing partners and donors. 
 
5.1.5. The Post-Busan Dialogue on Development Effectiveness 
The EU and its Member States played an active and constructive role in the Busan Fourth High-
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness as well as during its preparation. The Busan outcome document 
is in line with the priorities of the EU and its Member States: it is inclusive, it focuses and deepens 
aid effectiveness commitments while expanding to development effectiveness and, finally, it 
emphasises country level implementation while scaling down global governance structures. 
Final decisions on the mandate and the governance structure of the Global Partnership as well as 
monitoring framework set in the Busan outcome document were made by the Working Party on Aid 
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Effectiveness in late June. The main function of the Global Partnership will be to ensure continued 
accountability at the political level based on the evidence arising from country level 
implementation. Global monitoring arrangements, in turn, will build on country level monitoring 
processes based on a global set of core indicators on Busan priority themes. The decisions of the 
Working Party were based on the proposals negotiated by the Post-Busan Interim Group. From 
the EU and its Member States, the Commission (representing the EU), the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Sweden were members of the group and played an active role in it.  
As stated in the EU Common Position for Busan, the priority after Busan is to focus on the 
country level implementation of its aid and development effectiveness commitments. As shown 
by the available evidence, country-led and country-level results and mutual accountability 
frameworks are essential elements of country level implementation and partner countries' 
leadership. Many EU Member States are already engaged in these frameworks. However, there is 
room for further collective EU action to strengthen these frameworks or support their establishment. 
The EU and its Member States are progressing in implementing division of labour principles at the 
country level. This continued progress may provide opportunities to support country level 
implementation beyond complementarity and division of labour.  
 
5.2. Supporting better Global Governance  
5.2.1. The Evolving Global Context 
The EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness emphasised the 
importance of effective delivery for improving the quality of aid and increasing the impact of 
development financing from all sources.  
Improved global governance is one of the means for achieving this objective. It involves broadening 
cooperation will all relevant development partners, reducing and streamlining the global governance 
structure, and using existing mechanisms and fora to promote the aid and development effectiveness 
agenda and monitor its implementation.  
In that context, reducing aid fragmentation is a central challenge in order to move from 
individual country strategies towards partner country-led joint assistance strategies and to 
streamline the multilateral aid architecture. The EU is committed to self-restraint with regard to 
avoiding further proliferation of global and thematic programmes or vertical funds, and to use and 
strengthen the existing channels. The existing structures, notably UN, World Bank/IMF, regional 
structures, G20 and DAC should be used as fora to discuss aid effectiveness implementation and to 
strengthen wide development partnerships. 
The issue of institutional framework is also taken-up under the auspices of the OECD/DAC as the 
follow-up to the Busan Forum. The process aims to (a) establish a new, inclusive and representative 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation to support and ensure accountability for 
the implementation of commitments at the political level; and (b) agree on light working 
arrangements for this Global Partnership, including its membership and opportunities for regular 
ministerial-level engagement that complements, and is undertaken in conjunction with, other fora. 
Representatives from the EU, Sweden and UK are members of the working group considering this 
issue.  
EU Member States are contributing to the processes described above. For example, the UK played a 
full role in negotiations leading to agreement at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
to form a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. This sets the stage for a 
new development architecture reflecting a broader and more inclusive partnership for development 
than ever before.  
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5.2.2. Reforming Multilateral Institutions 
The 2011 Accountability Report provided a detailed account of the status of these reforms and only 
recent evolutions are presented herein. As mentioned above, the proposed continued reliance on 
existing structures underscores the importance of completing the reforms of multilateral institutions.  
A number of recent studies by EU Member States help identify areas of improvements for 
multilateral organisations. While primarily focused on efficiency and aid delivery, these studies 
have a bearing on governance of these organisations from the standpoint of responsibilities of their 
boards and how they operate. Partly because of the differing objectives and methodology, there is 
no common platform used by EU Member States to undertake such studies. The UK’s 2011 
Multilateral Aid Review
1
 (MAR) provided a comprehensive overview of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the multilateral organisations that DFID works with. The MAR confirmed that the 
multilateral system is a critical complement to what any government can do alone. It also found 
evidence of significant weaknesses. DFID has thus drawn on its value for money assessment to 
decide on funding through multilateral organisations, communicated its key reform priorities to 
each multilateral organisation and engaged closely both with the institutions themselves and their 
boards, and with other stakeholders to promote reform. Other EU Member States are also involved 
in assessments of multilateral organisations, notably through the Multilateral Organisation 
Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN).
2
 Similarly, Sweden has made assessments of 
multilateral organisations
3
, which are an important part of the implementation of its strategy for 
multilateral development cooperation. Lastly, in 2011 Denmark initiated its first full-scale annual 
multilateral review aimed at strengthening the strategic approach and coherence in its engagement 
in multilateral organisations system-wide. 
5.2.2.1. IMF, World Bank and other international fora 
The issue of improved African representation and voice, such as the African Union, in 
international fora, such as the G20, remains very important to the EU.  
The EU sees the implementation of the World Bank voice and participation reforms agreed in April 
2010 as a priority. In accordance with the second phase of voice reforms of March 2011, the voting 
power of developing countries and transition economies in the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) increased by 3.1 percentage points to a total of 47.2%. 
Under the new reforms, the Bank is required to review its shareholding every five years, starting in 
2015. Also in April 2011 the Executive Director Board approved a new process for selecting the 
World Bank President and then, for the IMF Managing Director. The process has been improved by 
adopting the recommendations of the Executive Directors' Working Group which was created in 
response to the Development Committee Communiqués of 2010 calling for open, merit-based and 
transparent selection of the World Bank President.  
The IMF quota reform
4
 agreed in 2010 will, once approved, shift more than 6% of quota to 
dynamic emerging market countries and from over-represented to under-represented countries; 
significantly re-distribute quotas and preserve the voting share of the poorest countries. Once 
                                                 
1
 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/multilateral_aid_review.pdf 
2
 http://www.mopanonline.org/ Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and UK are members of MOPAN. 
3
 http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/11747/a/122004 
4
 An IMF paper analysing quota reforms was issued in 2011: “Global Economic Governance: 
IMF Quota Reform”. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11208.pdf 
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implemented, the voting shares of US and EU members will fall below 50%. The EU intends to 
fully implement the 2010 quota and governance reform of the IMF by the agreed deadline of the 
2012 Annual Meetings. A significant number of EU Member States have already concluded 
national ratification procedures in that direction. The process is on-going in the remaining Member 
States and is projected to be completed by most Member States during 2012. Moreover, by 
consenting to two fewer seats for advanced European economies once the 2010 quota reform 
becomes effective, EU members will play their part in giving emerging markets and developing 
countries more visibility in the IMF Executive Board. Furthermore, the move to an all-elected 
Board will create a level-playing field for all IMF members. The Commission is continuously 
working to deepen and broaden the coordination between EU Member States, in order to strengthen 
Europe's voice in the IFIs.  
As regards Commission - IFI strategic relations in the area of development, a Taskforce has 
been established for an Enhanced Dialogue with International Organisations, focusing on the 
IFIs. The taskforce aims to develop a platform for a more structured dialogue with the IFIs (IMF, 
World Bank Group, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank) at senior management level, to identify joint actions and intervention 
frameworks in areas of mutual interest, and to formulate, co-ordinate and promote Commission and 
EU positions on development issues in the IFIs. Since the creation of the task force, dialogue and 
cooperation with the IMF (vulnerability/resilience in LICs, budget support and public financial 
management, capacity building) and the World Bank Group (private sector development, fragility 
and conflict situations, budget support) have been enhanced, with far more frequent meetings with 
the Bretton Woods institutions at senior management and political level.  
5.2.2.2. Other initiatives 
The following notable initiatives were launched recently: 
• The close cooperation between the EU, and the EIB and EBRD, particularly in the 
Neighbourhood region and (for EIB) ACP region was strengthened in 2011 and a new Tripartite 
MoU between the EC, EIB and EBRD on cooperation outside the European Union was signed 
in March 2011.  
• There is also a Commission proposal1 to the European Parliament and the Council to extend 
EBRD's mandate to the Middle East and North Africa region.  
 
                                                 
1
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0905:FIN:EN:PDF  
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